An evaluation of the role of fire extinguishers

Aim and audience 

This report was produced with the aim of providing an evidence-based assessment of the role of portable 

fire extinguishers within dwellings. This includes both single private dwellings and houses in multiple 

occupation (HMO), or other places where some form of accommodation is provided. Its value stems from 

its adoption, as far as possible, of a user-informed view of their benefit and operation. 

The report is intended to inform discussions and present a currently underrepresented perspective: that 

of the public. It explores both what is known about their behaviour/motivations when encountering a 

dwelling fire and considers how they are represented in official policies. 

As such, it will be of specific interest to those who produce guidance in relation to portable fire 

extinguishers, professionals involved anywhere in the lifecycle of portable fire extinguishers and to those 

with responsibility for fire safety in a property. It will also be relevant to policy makers, academics and 

others interested in the relationship between guidance, professions and the public. 

However, it has also been written in the hope it will also be accessible for the lay reader. Authentic twoway 

engagement with the public is essential for any meaningful and effective fire safety strategies, and 

more needs to be done to ensure their voice is heard. 

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Evidence base 

This report is not the result of a systematic review, but one in which, within the confines of the remit, 

evidence was sought to illustrate specific issues. The results help to build an ‘as is’ description of the role 

of portable fire extinguishers as seen from a user perspective. 

As far as possible, the evidence was sourced from academic studies, recognised sector publications and 

published data sources (see Bibliography). Each of these has its strengths and weaknesses along with 

various factors that influence its content and reliability. Individual assessments are not given for each 

evidence source, but, in combination, they were sufficient to develop a broad understanding in most 

areas and detailed insight in others. 

Throughout the report, reference is made to information that appears to be unavailable. It is accepted 

that some of these sources may exist, but were either not discovered by the author, or may be held 

within private domains, e.g. companies. Unless otherwise stated, their omission does not undermine the 

findings. 

In general, this report refers to both dwelling (single) and HMO premises without distinction. This is 

because the evidence either, does not reveal notable differences, or is too scarce to form a view. 

However, the application of the findings of this report are not always of equal significance to each 

property type. Each section identifies any important features applicable primarily, or solely, to an HMO. 

In recognition of the limited and fragmented evidence, it is a recommendation of this report that more be 

done to build a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the public experience of using a portable 

fire extinguisher. Without this, it appears impossible to have confidence that those charged with making 

decisions about portable fire extinguishers are doing so based on a full and current knowledge. Where 

public safety is at stake, this should be a minimum requirement. 

Where opinion is offered, it is that of the author’s alone unless otherwise stated. Readers are welcome to 

disagree and, in doing so, may find it helpful to consider why. Is it due to their experience, knowledge or 

assumptions? A curiosity-driven mindset will enhance the value of the report far beyond its stated 

content and will hopefully lead to discussions that continuously drive improvement. 

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Definitions 

Dwelling fires – fires in properties that are a place of residence, i.e. places occupied by households such 

as houses and flats, excluding hotels/hostels and residential institutions. Dwellings also includes nonpermanent 

structures used solely as a dwelling, such as houseboats and caravans. 

Houses in multiple occupation (HMO) – is a property rented out by at least three people who are not 

from one ‘household’ (for example, a family), but share facilities like the bathroom and kitchen. It is 

sometimes called a ‘house share’. 

Non-residential buildings – includes properties such as offices, shops, factories, warehouses, restaurants, 

public buildings, religious buildings, etc. 

Primary fires – are potentially more serious fires that harm people or cause damage to property and meet 

at least one of the following conditions: any fire that occurred in a (non-derelict) building, vehicle or 

(some) outdoor structures; any fire involving fatalities, casualties or rescues; any fire attended by five or 

more pumping appliances. 

Response time – the ‘total response time’ measures the minutes and seconds taken from time of call to 

time of arrival at the scene of the first vehicle. 

Risk – a function of the combined effects of hazards, the assets or people exposed to hazards and the 

vulnerability of those exposed elements. 

Other building fires – fires in other residential or non-residential buildings. Other (institutional) residential 

buildings include properties such as hostels/hotels/B&Bs, nursing/care homes, student halls of residence, 

etc. 

Sources: all definitions are from Fire Statistics definitions except for ‘houses in multiple occupation’ from 

www.gov.uk and ‘risk’ from Sendai framework (see Bibliography). 

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Executive summary 

1. This report considers the use of portable fire extinguishers in dwellings/HMO. It does so by drawing 

largely on evidence and data that provide a human or public perspective on their use and benefit. 

2. It finds that the contribution of the extinguisher and the public in using them, attracts little 

attention and is poorly recorded within academia, government or the wider fire safety sector. And 

yet, it is this perspective which ultimately identifies their true contribution and value. 

3. The report identifies that there is a fundamental discrepancy between official/policy assumptions 

and the public in relation to priorities in the event of a fire. Government and professionals focus on 

avoiding injuries and see that as the sole aspiration, in the pursuit of which everything else is 

secondary. As a result, they consider the public role to be one of compliance in which they simply 

exit the premises on becoming aware of a fire. If true, this would require little, if any, decisionmaking 

by the public. 

4. In contrast, the public have a wide and largely unrecognised range of priorities when encountering 

a fire, based on their individual circumstances. These include: the avoidance of 

embarrassment/inconvenience; mitigating the impact of damage to the property, e.g. avoiding the 

risk of being unable to remain in their home; and their concern for the wellbeing of other people, 

pets or valued possessions. Pursuing these priorities requires numerous decisions, and yet they are 

not aided in this by any guidance from the professional services either before, or during the event. 

5. A desire to achieve their self-appointed tasks is a strong motivation for the public’s behaviour 

when encountering a fire. For most, this will involve an active response of on average five actions, 

although for some it will be as many as 11. This includes investigating the initial cues and tackling 

the fire, often using improvised means. They are usually successful in doing so, with 70% to 80% of 

fires dealt with by the public without requiring professional assistance. It is important to note that 

in doing so, they are willingly acting against official advice and are not being coerced into this. The 

evidence shows the public to be effective and capable in tackling fires, even in the absence of any 

professional support, or often without specialist equipment. 

6. The size of fires is decreasing – both those the fire and rescue service (FRS) attends and those that 

the public deal with. In either case, the early interventions of the public are likely to be the most 

significant determinant of the outcome. 

7. The FRS response time to dwelling fires has increased by nearly 50% over the past 25 years. As the 

FRS does not routinely provide any support or intervention until their arrival, the reduction in fire 

size, etc. must be attributable to other factors, including the role of the public. The continued focus 

on the FRS response time diverts from the exploration of other policy options to share their 

professional expertise in the absence of a physical attendance, e.g. remote assistance. 

8. Literature shows the relatively small and distinct section of the public at risk of a fatal outcome in a 

dwelling fire generally has specific characteristics. These characteristics make them vulnerable by 

leaving them to be unable to respond to a fire or causing them to do so in an appropriate way. 

9. However, most people do respond appropriately, and the literature confirms that they 

do not panic. Typically, most people are at risk of a minor injury at worst, due to the 

low risk from the fire and their own ability to assess and act in accordance with the 

situation. Where a minor injury is incurred, the public almost unequivocally see it as 

a reasonable trade-off for whatever activities they were undertaking. 

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10. There is limited literature and data readily available regarding the public experience of 

dwelling/HMO fires, particularly of tackling fires and extinguisher use. The value of available 

dwelling fire research is often diminished by numerous studies failing to understand and 

distinguish between different types of risk, e.g. the risk of a fire starting or of it causing an injury. 

Instead, they often use the term interchangeably and generically. 

11. This is further compounded by official advice that at times confuses and exaggerates the risks to 

people encountering a fire and overstates the influence of equipment such as smoke detectors. 

This is likely to be a self-perpetuating process due to inherent biases, which, in turn, inform and 

limit the nature of data collection and analysis providing a partial and skewed perspective. This 

undermines credible risk communication and may explain the limited the impact of official advice. 

12. This report identifies that the provision of fire extinguishers in private dwellings is generally low 

and, as such, improvised means are often used for fighting fires. Extinguishers are more prevalent 

in HMO because of legislative requirements for the common areas. Several publications identified 

vandalism as a significant issue affecting extinguishers in common areas. However, this could not 

be verified in either its potential nature or scale due to a lack of data/evidence. 

13. Training in the use of extinguishers is an important issue and one in which opinion appears more 

influential than the evidence. Whether purchased for a private dwelling or provided through 

regulatory processes, there is no mandatory requirement for training to use an extinguisher, and 

studies do not reveal training to be a requirement for their safe or effective use. In fact, the 

available data and studies demonstrate the opposite to be the case. 

14. Despite this, the potential for them to be used by untrained people is stated in some codes of 

practice/guides as a sufficient reason to not install (or remove existing) extinguishers in common 

areas. The evidence to support this claim could not be identified, and yet it continues to be 

repeated. For example, the advice given by experts to the Grenfell Inquiry led it to feel unable to 

recommend the use of extinguishers in its Phase 1 report. Unfortunately, the potential for the 

absence of extinguishers to create a more significant risk does not seem to merit consideration. 

15. Various documents from professional bodies identify that competent risk assessors should have a 

knowledge of human behaviour. However, little evidence was found to identify human behaviour 

as an active and influential component of the sector. Fire safety is grounded in the engineering 

discipline, and this brings many strengths. But it is insufficient, and fire safety effectiveness is 

limited by ignoring, or insufficient incorporation of, other disciplines, including the social sciences. 

16. Overall, this report finds that the use of fire extinguishers suffers from several systemic issues 

which adversely distort their true role and influence. Some of the key ones are: 

a. Too many false assumptions and evidence gaps in influential policy areas. 

b. A disconnect between the fire safety profession (in both public and private sectors) and the 

public it serves. The latter being poorly represented (directly or indirectly) in policy and 

guidance creation. 

c. The dominance of the engineering discipline to the detriment of a broader multidisciplinary 

and user-centred model. 

d. A paternalistic approach by which government and the fire safety sector seek to 

change, rather than work with the public. This, despite the evidence that public 

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behaviours are safe, effective, and largely unaltered by current guidance and 

campaigns.

The public view of a good outcome 

17. A portable fire extinguisher is an item which allows for small fires to be tackled by members of the 

public. Despite the apparent simplicity of that statement, the risks and benefits of using one are 

complex and extend beyond the immediate point of operation to include long-term and 

consequential outcomes. 

18. To make an informed decision regarding the suitability and use of extinguishers requires that a full 

appreciation of risk and benefit sought be incorporated into any calculation/decision. That does 

not appear to be the case currently, and the public perspective is absent or at least poorly 

represented in available literature and data. Neither do they (directly or indirectly) seem to be well 

represented in design/planning structures. 

19. Beyond extinguishing a fire to remove the immediate threat, defining a ‘good outcome’ when a fire 

occurs is surprisingly an area that has not received much attention. In the absence of a common 

understanding, the answer will often be closely aligned to the viewpoint and interests of specific 

stakeholders. However, with so many different stakeholders, there is clearly not a single answer, 

and each claim will have its own legitimacy. But the central theme of this report, is that the public 

view is poorly known and under-represented. And that has important consequences for their 

safety. 

20. As such, this report starts by considering the public view of what a good outcome looks like. This 

then frames and informs the remainder of the report content and allows consideration of the 

extent to which current arrangements reflect their needs. It is important to appreciate that whilst 

different to official assumptions, the research shows the public’s priorities to be rational and 

appropriate. 

21. The public experience of fire is vastly different to that of the professionals involved in planning for, 

responding to and recovering from dwelling/HMO fires. This is at the same time obvious and yet 

not fully appreciated in practice. Some key findings from research studies are set out below and 

briefly identify desirable public-oriented outcomes under the headings of 1) avoidance of 

embarrassment/inconvenience; 2) damage to premises; 3) injuries; 4) people, pets and possessions 

and 5) consequential impact. 

22. Avoidance of embarrassment/inconvenience – Recent studies have demonstrated the important 

influence of emotion in how the public react. For many people, calling the FRS is a last resort as 

they are aware it will attract potentially unwanted attention from neighbours due to the visibility 

of the emergency response presence. Others stated concerns that they would be diverting the FRS 

from more important incidents. Some still believed they would be charged for calling the FRS. 

23. Therefore, the potential to avoid the need to call 999, by tackling the fire themselves, prevents 

exposing them to these negative emotions. So, one driver of behaviour at the early stage of a fire is 

the desire to avoid certain perceived social consequences or unwanted attention from official 

agencies (for which there can be many reasons). 

24. Damage to premises – Recording the extent of damage to a premises is clearly an important 

and useful indicator. However, its perceived value appears more geared towards internal 

use by the various professions than to considering it to inform and optimise public 

outcomes. For that, consideration must be given to the possible impacts of damage 

to the premises. 

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25. Limiting the fire to the smallest area within a premises is a sensible aspiration, but of itself is 

potentially insufficient to achieve the best possible outcome. From the public perspective, the 

function of the rooms affected also matters. A fire affecting two rooms may seem relatively minor 

for official recording purposes. But if they are the kitchen and/or bathroom, then rehousing may 

be necessary, even if the remainder of the house is unaffected. Awareness of the potential 

consequences of fire damage is likely to be more intuitive and important to those present/affected 

than to professionals. As such it guides their actions in a way that is not recognised in fire safety 

guidance or emergency response tactics. 

26. If a dwelling/HMO is made untenable because of the fire, then those affected may have to stay 

with family/friends, pay for temporary accommodation or be allocated social housing intended for 

others. All these eventualities can disrupt normal patterns of life in areas such as schooling, work 

and social life. Where the fire affects someone in a house adapted to their specific needs, the 

disruption and distress is even more acute. Therefore, avoiding the need for re-homing or other 

consequences is, of course, a desirable outcome for most people and may lead them to act to 

preserve key rooms. With many fires starting in the kitchen, this is an important consideration for 

why people may tackle fires themselves. 

27. Injuries – Official policy and attitude is almost singularly directed at avoiding the risk of injury when 

the public encounter a fire. This is well meaning, but research has shown that it does not align with 

the public attitude or ability. This reality gap reduces the relevance and impact of fire safety 

measures. 

28. Most of the public do avoid injury, not by luck, but through active decision-making and because of 

the relatively low level of risk they encounter in dwelling/HMO fires. And where incurred, most 

injuries are of a minor nature. The relatively small group at risk of dying, tend to have specific 

characteristics which prevent them responding to the fire either through physical or mental 

limitations. This means those most at risk are unlikely to use fire extinguishers. 

29. The evidence further identifies that the public are willing to accept minor injuries (e.g. small burns 

or smoke inhalation) in pursuit of achieving their priorities. Even in hindsight, few, if any of those 

injured, would change anything. Avoidance of any injury is not therefore of itself sufficient to be 

considered a good outcome, although, clearly, a serious injury would be an undesirable outcome in 

most circumstances. 

30. People, pets, and possessions – Concern for people, pets and possessions are strong and 

established drivers of behaviour in the event of a fire. In fact, this can be instinctively appreciated 

as the desire to protect things people cherish from any form of harm is a natural tendency. It is 

therefore no surprise to see it as an influential feature of people’s response to dwelling fires. 

31. Mass casualty studies show that sustained concern and care for other people can also result from 

relatively minor associations, or even where there has been no previous contact. Selfish behaviour 

is, in fact, rare. Dwelling fire studies identified ensuring the welfare of family and friends is 

something that people would view as a good outcome. However, the research also identified that 

warning other residents in a multi-occupied property (e.g. flats) was important. This 

suggests a sense of concern for others and potentially a personal desire to know they 

have done the right thing, which is also an important outcome for most. 

8

32. Pets were also found to be very influential in driving behaviours. For some, they are their only 

companion and were afforded the same importance as a person would be. Their wellbeing and 

how they were treated (even if they did not survive) matter. 

33. The importance of possessions can easily be overlooked and dismissed as most objects are 

replaceable. Whilst that is true for many items, not all possessions are equal. For some people, a 

laptop may just be an easily replaced entertainment device, storing nothing of importance. For 

others, it may contain the only record of their personal or business records, which if lost, would 

severely impair their future prosperity. Mobile phones may be important both for what they 

contain but also because the occupier may foresee the need for one to stay in contact with 

friends/families during and post-fire. 

34. Items which cannot be replaced are also highly valued and may result in attempts to preserve them 

from the effects of a fire. These may include obvious items such as photos, high-value items or 

something with sentimental value. Other categories include those where replacement represents 

significant perceived effort or inconvenience if lost, e.g. a passport or other formal documents. 

Preservation of valued items, as determined by the owner, is an important outcome. 

35. Long-term consequences – There are also other less obvious or longer-term consequences incurred 

by the public. These are often invisible as they are not captured by routine data collection, 

potentially due to perceived difficulties in obtaining or sharing information or even institutional 

bias which does not recognise its value and importance. 

36. This is compounded by the limited number of studies that have looked at dwelling/HMO fires from 

the survivor perspective to understand, amongst other aspects, the emotional/psychosocial 

experience and personal/extended impact. The public are exposed to many of the same (and some 

unique) experiences as the professional responders. And whilst the potential mental health risks to 

the latter are recognised, this is not the case for the public. As a result, they are unlikely to receive 

the support they need after the fire. Studies have shown that even small fires can have long-term 

or life-changing consequences and the impact of a fire is not always linearly proportional to its size. 

37. It has also been found that for some people, the effects of a fire, in isolation or in combination with 

other life events, can be overwhelming. They then experience various degrees of difficulty dealing 

with everyday life and/or recovery from the fire. As a result, they suffer a form of vulnerability 

which is greater than the sum of its parts and can affect every part of their life. 

38. Linked to emotional wellbeing is the fact that people believe they did the right thing and all within 

their ability to reduce the harm caused by a fire, particularly if they felt some degree of 

responsibility for its cause or development. How people feel about their actions is an important 

outcome and influence. This can be either positive or negative and relates to their own assessment 

and the judgement of others. 

39. Avoidance of the longer-term or consequential effects is clearly a good outcome for the individual 

and others impacted as a result. Unlike the other categories, these long-term consequences are 

likely to be less appreciated at the time by the public. As such, it may not influence their 

behaviour during a fire, and it could be some time before they realise the true impact 

it has had on them. 

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40. To capture the concept of indirect harm, the definition of risk adopted by the Sendai 

Framework (see definitions) is helpful because of its inclusion of ‘vulnerability’. This 

recognises that events can have an immediate impact but also make those affected 

vulnerable to secondary or consequential harms. 

41. Other stakeholders – Raising awareness of the public need is not denying the legitimate interests 

of the other/professional stakeholders. Each is invested in the fire safety ecosystem and has a vital 

role to play. Each will also understand what a good outcome looks like for them, both as 

individuals and organisations. 

42. For some, compliance with legislation, regulation or technical standards will be important, others 

will have financial incentives or considerations, and some may need to act in accordance with 

client requirements. Ideally these will all align or can at least co-exist. 

43. Each of these participants will usually have the means and opportunity to bring their valuable 

organisational and professional perspectives to the debate where necessary. Unfortunately, that is 

not the case for the public who rarely, if ever, directly participate in policy/industry forums and 

whose accounts are poorly documented in evidential or data sources. That means many decisions 

are made without being informed by those most impacted by the decisions: the public. 

44. As such, understanding and aligning the needs of all stakeholders, or at least finding a shared aim, 

is a prerequisite to getting the optimal outcome for all. This requires purposeful design and cannot 

be left to chance or be assumed to be a natural and self-organising outcome. 

45. It should also be noted that in such a complex environment, there is always the potential for 

conflicts of interests at an organisational and personal level. These may occur where compliance 

with the stated (or assumed) common purpose is detrimental, or where deviance from it provides 

the opportunity for benefit to individual stakeholders. Considering the presence or extent of 

conflicts of interest was not a feature of this research or report. It is highlighted to acknowledge 

they exist and are likely to have at least some influence on all stakeholders within the fire safety 

domain. No organisation (public or private) is entirely neutral or without their own agenda. 

10

The characteristics of dwelling fires 

Introduction 

46. The previous section addressed a public-oriented view of what a good outcome looks like when a 

dwelling/HMO fire occurs. Many of their priorities will be achieved, or strongly influenced, by 

restricting the damage caused by a fire. Typically, that means tackling it as soon as possible after 

discovery. The evidence identifies that this occurs in most fires, mainly due to the actions of the 

public. This section attempts to understand the characteristics of dwelling fires from published 

data and, in doing so, to identify the nature of the risk in terms of fires encountered by the public. 

47. Portable fire extinguishers are intended for use on small fires. Similar generic descriptions (e.g. 

they are for ‘first aid firefighting’) are frequently used but not particularly helpful, as they are 

subjective and may mean different things to different people. Therefore, this section seeks to 

quantify the size of real fires encountered, albeit based on an estimation of the post-fire damage. 

48. The location of fires has not been included although it does, of course, influence some features of 

the fire and its behaviour. However, it is assumed that where extinguishers have been 

professionally commissioned, the appropriate extinguisher would have been selected for the risk 

profile. 

The likelihood of experiencing a dwelling fire 

49. The number of dwelling fires attended by the FRS has been on a long downward trend, in absolute 

terms, despite a rising population size and an increased number of dwellings. Official FRS data 

identifies that: 

a. In Great Britain (GB), the FRS attended 64,032 dwelling fires in 1994/95; a figure which 

had fallen to 36,283 in 2018/19. 

b. For England, there were 44,601 recorded dwelling fires in 1981/82, which then rose to a 

peak of 58,280 in 1999/00, from which it has subsequently maintained a general downward 

trend to the 2018/19 figure of 29,592. 

c. In Scotland dwelling fires also decreased, from 9,811 in 1990/91 to 5,137 for 2018/19. 

d. Wales has followed a similar trend with 3,030 recorded in 1994/95 falling to 1,554 in 

2018/19. 

50. It should be noted that these figures identify fires attended by the FRS but not the actions taken. A 

proportion of these fires will be ‘out on arrival’ and would not have required an active intervention 

by the FRS. 

51. Data in relation to dwelling fires that the FRS does not attend is not routinely collected. However, 

the results of periodic sample surveys such as the British Crime Survey (BCS) and English Housing 

Survey (EHS) do, at least, provide some insight. The figures from these provide a national estimate 

derived from the survey results, and so care must be taken in using them. However, at face 

value they do suggest a downward trend in the number of fires, like that seen in fires 

attended by the FRS. 

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52. Between 2001/02 and 2002/03, the BCS recorded an estimated drop in the number of 

dwelling fires from 383,000 to 372,000 in England and Wales. The English Housing Survey for 

2013/14 recorded an estimated 206,980 dwelling fires in England compared to 273,000 in its 

2004/05 survey. 

53. In summary, whether attended by the FRS or dealt with by the public, dwelling fires have exhibited 

a sustained downward trend. As such, the likelihood of any person, household or other dwelling 

experiencing a fire is also decreasing. 

Dwelling fires rarely extend beyond the room of origin 

54. In respect of the fire size, official published data relates to the end state after the fire has been 

extinguished. For this report, it is a proxy indicator as it does not directly identify the conditions at 

the time the fire was discovered, and/or when attempts were made to tackle it by the public. 

55. Overall, the data reveals that the size of dwelling fires is relatively small. Two FRS data sets have 

been used as indicators for the purpose of this assessment - fire spread and area of fire damage. 

And data from the BCS relating to financial loss provides some insight in to fires that were not 

attended by the FRS. 

Fire spread 

56. Of the dwelling fires attended by the FRS in England during the 12-month period in 2018/19: 

• 30% resulted in no fire damage 

• 32% resulted in the fire being limited to the item first ignited 

• 25% resulted in the fire being limited to the room of origin 

This means that in 87% of cases the fire did not spread beyond the room of origin. 

57. This data was first published for the year 2010/11 and during that period the findings were similar: 

• 32% resulted in no fire damage 

• 28% resulted in the fire being limited to the item first ignited 

• 27% resulted in the fire being limited to the room of origin 

This means that, again, in 87% of cases the fire did not spread beyond the room of origin. 

58. Of the dwelling fires attended by the Scottish FRS during the 12-month period in 2018/19: 

• 47% were recorded as causing smoke and heat damage only 

• 26% were confined to the item of origin 

• 16% were confined to the room of origin. 


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59. In 2009/10 the figures for the same were: 

• 45% resulted in no damage, 

• 21% were limited to the item first ignited 

• 19% did not extend beyond the room of origin 


60. Of the dwelling fires attended by the Welsh FRS in the 12-month period 2018/19: 

• 25% were recorded as causing no fire damage 


• 23% were confined to the room of origin. 


61. In the 2009/10 period, the corresponding figures were: 

• 35% caused no fire damage 


• 21% were confined to the room of origin 


62. For the years shown, the percentage of fires that either caused no damage or did not extend 

beyond the item first ignited ranged from 60% to 73%. And in a further 25% to 26% of incidents 

attended by the FRS, the fire did not spread beyond the room of origin. The data suggests a stable 

but downward trend for the spread of fire. 

Area of fire damage 

63. In England, the average area of fire damage for all dwelling fires in 2001/02 was 26.3 m2. With 

minor fluctuations, this has gradually decreased to an average of 16.2 m2 in 2018/19 (Home Office, 

2019). This represents a reduction in average area of fire damage of 38% in just 17 years. 

64. In Scotland: 

• the proportion of fires resulting in no damage increased from 11% to 14% in the period 

2009 to 2019 

• those causing smoke and heat damage only (no fire damage) accounted for 38% in 2009/10 

and 43% in 2018/19. 

• Fires causing under 5 m2 of damage decreased from 25% to 22% and 

• Fires causing between 6 m2 to 10 m2 of damage remained at 4%. 

• Larger fires of 11 m2 or above fell from 22% in 09/10 to 16% by 2018/19. 

Overall, the proportion of fires attended by the Scottish FRS resulting in no damage, smoke and 

heat damage only or under 5 m2 of fire damage accounted for 75% in 2009/10 and 80% 

in 2018/19. The data shows an increase in smaller fires and a decrease in larger ones. 

14

65. In Wales: 

• the proportion of fires resulting in no damage increased from 10% in 2009/10 to 20% in 

2018/19 

• fires causing under 5 m2 increased from 47% to 49%, 

• Fires causing between 6 m2 and 10 m2 decreased slightly from 11% to 9%. 

Larger fires appear to be decreasing as a proportion of dwelling fires attended. Grouping the 

categories for damage in the range of 51 m2 to 1000 m2 identifies a reduction from accounting for 

10% of dwelling fires in 2009/10 to 8% in 2018/19. 

Overall, the proportion of fires attended by the Welsh FRS resulting in no damage or under 5 m2 of 

fire damage accounted for 57% in 09/10 and 69% in 2018/19. 

66. For the years shown, the size of fire by average area of damage has shown a substantial reduction 

in England. Scotland and Wales have shown more moderate changes, but the trend in each is that 

the size of fires is decreasing. In turn the proportion of small fires is increasing, and the proportion 

of larger fires is decreasing. 

Financial estimates 

67. The BCS did not record the area of physical damage due to fire. Instead, it used a cost-based 

measure. In the three surveys covering the period, 2001 to 2005, between 42% and 48% of fires 

resulted in no financial loss. The two surveys between 2001 and 2003 both identified that a further 

19% caused only a minimal financial loss. 

68. Whilst not directly comparable to FRS data, this does provide some degree of consistency in 

suggesting that most dwelling fires are small. Of note is that the majority of the BCS respondents 

did not call the FRS, and so, within reason, the data provides an insight into the experience of this 

important group. 

Characteristics of HMO fires 

69. It is not clear how many fires in an HMO do not result in calling the FRS, and whether the ratio 

between those they attend and do not attend corresponds with that of dwelling fires in general. 

There are factors which could potentially influence it to be higher or lower. Further data and 

studies from real fires are needed to improve the evidential basis for this area and any implications 

resulting. 

70. However, data recorded by the FRS does identify how many properties providing some form of 

accommodation other than single private dwellings they attended. The figures below are for fires 

attended by the FRS in England in the period from 1994/95 to 2018/19. 

• Fires in Hospital and medical care facilities have decreased from 1006 to 636 

• Fires in Education premises have decreased from 884 to 582 

• Fires in Hotels and Boarding premises have decreased from 1018 to 613 

• Fires in Communal Living have decreased from 2348 to 1168 

Note: Communal living includes: Boarding school accommodation, Military/barracks, 

Monastery/convent, Nurses'/Doctors' accommodation, Other residential home, 

residential home, Sheltered housing and Student hall of residence. 

15

71. All categories are exhibiting pronounced downward trends with the number of fires in communal 

living premises attended by the FRS falling by 50%. 

The role and influence of fire growth modelling 

72. Published data regarding the size of a fire is helpful in providing a reference point for the final 

extent of a dwelling fire. If the fire was extinguished quickly by whatever means, then the end 

state may closely resemble the fire as it was on discovery or when being tackled. However, if there 

were delays in sourcing/preparing extinguishing medium or its application was ineffective in 

tackling the fire for any reason, then it may not. Given that most fires are contained to the item 

first ignited or the room of origin, it is likely that there is not much difference between size at 

discovery and when extinguished. 

73. Only one study was found that provided an insight into the size of fire from discovery onwards, 

capturing this information in survey form. The lack of data from real fires, despite its ready 

availability and benefits, means reliance is placed on other means. And yet, an accurate knowledge 

of typical fire development behaviour is an essential requirement for meaningful risk assessments. 

74. Within the literature, there is an active and extensive body of work addressing various aspects of 

fire and fire development, either as a natural or applied science. A number of these seek to 

develop a ‘standard’ fire growth curve model. This is clearly an extensive subject, but a brief 

overview of its role is useful in considering dwelling/HMO fires. 

75. By necessity, the models are usually underpinned by data collected from fires created for the 

purpose and set under controlled but often artificial conditions. This approach obviously has many 

advantages. Not least, the ability to install equipment to record different aspects of the fire and to 

plan when the fire will occur. However, they do have limitations in their ability to replicate real fire 

conditions and development. Some of these discrepancies have been exposed through the 

ongoing Grenfell Inquiry. 

76. Typically, controlled tests produce a pattern of fire growth and decay, often with indicative timings 

for the duration of each phase. Examples of the application of the resultant fire development 

models include testing scenarios in relation to fire safety for new building designs or to assess 

mass evacuation plans. As many of these relate to unique premises with customised fire safety 

arrangements, the modelling approach is an appropriate, proportionate and cost-effective option. 

77. Quantifying and standardising predicted fire development also underpins influential concepts such 

as the ‘Available Safe Egress Time’ (ASET) or ‘Required Safe Egress Time’ (RSET). Their efficacy 

relies largely on the assumption that the public/occupants would respond in line with official 

assumptions. Further, they assume the fire development to be the dominant feature, and one 

largely unaffected by the actions of the occupants/public, which is not supported by the evidence. 

78. The models are also used to identify the time after which it is believed anyone trapped in the 

building is unlikely to survive. This is informed mainly from fatal fire studies and knowledge about 

survivors is notably limited. For example, a recent literature review found no studies that 

focussed on the behaviours and motivations of children who survived fires. This has 

important ramifications for fire safety across multiple policy areas. 

16

79. This quantified modelling approach and resultant timings are very influential on thinking, policy 

and the planning of fire safety services. For example, they underpin the assumptions made in the 

provision of fire cover by the FRS. However, in relation to dwelling/HMO fires, the evidence from 

real fires does not seem to accord well with the models in predicting fire behaviour. It has been 

seen that many fires do not develop beyond the item first ignited, and the proportion of larger 

fires is decreasing. 

80. As the data shows the trend in fire development to be dynamic (e.g. the fire size is decreasing), 

test fire conditions and modelling should be regularly reviewed, and cross-referenced to real fire 

data to ensure their representativeness and appropriateness. This should include the known 

influence of human behaviour and activity in relation to fire behaviour. Many tests fail to 

incorporate this and present a potentially false model in which the fire and building alone are 

presented as the key and unconstrained determinants of fire development. This can lead to worst 

case and atypical results being misrepresented as a standard and common scenarios. This has 

serious and often harmful repercussions on subsequent thinking and practice. 

The average FRS response time is increasing 

81. In England, the average response time to primary fires in 2018/19 was 8 minutes and 49 seconds. 

This is an increase of 11 seconds since 2017/18 and 33 seconds since 2013/14. 

82. The latest published average response time for a dwelling fire in England is 7 minutes and 47 

seconds which is a one-second improvement on the previous year but an increase of 18 seconds 

since 2013/14, and a significant increase from the 5 minutes and 33 second average recorded in 

1994/95. 

83. The response time is a longstanding and important measure for the FRS, which is used as a proxy 

for effectiveness. It is assumed that the quicker the professional emergency response, the better 

the outcome, and this is a key factor for planning emergency cover. 

84. However, caution is suggested in the application and interpretation of this measure, as it is, in 

many ways, misleading and insufficient on its own. It assumes that the public, on becoming aware 

of a possible or actual fire, immediately call 999. Studies refute this, demonstrating that the public 

are active and calling 999 is their penultimate action, although in the majority of dwelling/HMO 

fires they do not need to do so. 

85. There is also an assumption or expectation that, the public, having called 999 and exited the 

dwelling/HMO, will wait passively until the FRS arrives. Again, studies demonstrate this to be 

untrue, with the public often remaining active, including re-entering the property. As data is not 

routinely collected on these public actions and interventions, it is not possible to fully understand 

the relationship between them, fire development and the response time. 

86. A further caveat is that the response time simply means the first appliance arrived at the scene. 

For a dwelling/HMO fire, at least two appliances will typically be mobilised, and the time until the 

full required attendance is at the scene is not published. As such, the response time does 

not provide any insight into how long after arrival after the first appliance it takes for 

the FRS to have sufficient resources present to carry out any meaningful interventions. 

This is compounded by the absence of any published data regarding the post-arrival 

17 

activity and performance of the FRS.

87. As set out above, the correlation between response time and specific outcomes is questionable 

and not established by the available data, which fails to provide a complete picture. That is not so 

much an argument against the response time, but recognition that on its own, it provides little in 

the way of meaningful information to predict the outcome of a dwelling/HMO fire. Other 

important data is required to achieve this. 

18 

6

Human behaviour and motivation in dwelling fires 

Introduction 

88. In this section, an outline of some of the important and relevant findings from the available 

literature regarding human behaviour in dwelling/HMO fires are set out. 

89. There is a specialised but active field of study that considers the public experience and role in 

relation to mass casualty or large-scale events. These studies increasingly recognise the positive 

contribution made by the public prior to the arrival of the emergency services. 

90. Conversely, relatively little is known about how people respond as individuals or in small groups in 

domestic settings to what may be considered normal or everyday dwelling fires. Pioneering studies 

of the public experience of dwelling fires were undertaken by Bryan (1977) and Wood (1972) in the 

USA and UK, respectively. They found that the public undertook a range of self-appointed tasks 

including investigating and tackling fires. Recent studies have confirmed similar findings and these 

behaviours appear consistent over time. 

91. Where undertaken, many studies that try to identify risk factors in relation to dwelling/HMO fires 

erroneously assume a ‘flight’ response as the sole intended aim of the public. This is often 

accompanied by a degree of paternalism that assumes that where the public behaviour differs 

from official guidance, it is wrong and can be changed. As a result, these studies focus more on 

how to segment the public or change public behaviour rather than how to adapt policies and 

practice to better accord with the public. 

92. Whether this approach influences, or is influenced by, official policy which takes the same view is 

not clear. But it does compound the failure to appreciate the wider scope of public priorities and 

their contribution prior to, or in the absence of a professional response. 

93. This reality gap was recognised by a Dutch study which recommended ‘understanding how 

individuals behave in the case of fire and fire evacuation is essential if we are to bring fire safety 

measures into line with occupants’ needs during an incident.’ 

94. The lack of academic grounding, in favour of assumptions about human behaviour for key policy 

areas and practice is concerning and potentially harmful. The belief that ‘undesirable’ behaviour 

can be changed by advice, campaigns or other measures has been shown to be inaccurate. Instead, 

fire safety policies must adapt to work with the evidenced and generally beneficial behaviours of 

the public. 

Injuries 

95. In fire safety literature and guidance, there is a tendency to refer to injury risk as a single and 

generic classification. This is an inaccurate simplification and has detrimental consequences. 

96. Due to their higher profile and the subsequent investigations providing abundant data, fatal fires 

tend to be well studied. As a result, the characteristics of those likely to die in a fire are 

relatively well known and generally consistent. Most studies identify that these 

characteristics mean this group is poorly disposed (through mental or physical 

impairment) towards responding appropriately in the event of a fire. As such, they are 

unlikely to use an extinguisher, or if they did, could not be relied upon to do so safely 

and effectively. 

20 

18

97. Instead, they need different interventions to keep them safe, and are better served by enhanced 

fire prevention measures or automated protection in the event of a fire, e.g. sprinklers. However, 

they are excluded as potential extinguisher users for the purpose of this report. 

98. Literature and guidance do not adequately recognise that this is a relatively small and specific risk 

group. Instead, there seems to be an implicit assumption that everyone starts with an equal risk of 

dying in a fire, and only an intervention of some sort prevents them all from that fate. This can be 

seen where fire safety messaging to the general public still relays the ‘Fire Kills’ message 

suggesting everyone is at risk of this outcome. 

99. Fortunately, most people encountering a fire will avoid any injury or will be exposed to a low, and 

often considered risk of a minor injury at worst. This is not a matter of luck but due to a 

combination of their own abilities and to the low level of risk presented by most fires. 

100. This is even allowing for the fact that compared to other fire types attended by the FRS, accidental 

dwelling fires are responsible for a disproportional number of injuries. They account for between 

8% and 20% of all fires but are responsible for between 58% and 70% of all fire-related injuries and 

deaths. This trend has been consistent for many years and suggests a failure of policy for this 

group. Whilst the likelihood of having a dwelling fire has decreased, the potential for it to cause an 

injury has not altered. This may again suggest the need to rethink the current reliance on a 

professional response model rather than an integrated model that works with the public by design. 

101. However, the total number of injuries has been falling for many years. Dwelling fires attended by 

the FRS in 2018/19 accounted for 5,239 non-fatal injuries compared to 5,458 in the preceding year 

and 7,455 in 2008/09. This is at least partly explained by the decrease in the overall number of 

dwelling fires which has led to a related drop in injuries. Unlike fatalities, the circumstances leading 

to an injury are rarely, if ever, recorded meaning little is known about how they are incurred 

102. As the FRS only attends 20%–30% of all dwelling fires, its data does not provide a true or full 

means by which to assess the risks associated with a dwelling/HMO fire. For that, the EHS and BCS 

are useful additions as their random sampling means that it includes both fires attended by the 

FRS and those dealt with by the public. Their data identifies that between 89% and 93% of the 

dwelling fires resulted in no injuries at all. Where an injury occurred, it was most likely to be due to 

smoke inhalation with burns/scalds being another reported, but lower frequency type of injury. 

103. Headline injury trends from 2018-19 FRS data identify that there were 2 fatalities in communal 

living premises and 279 non-fatal casualties. 

104. A 2015 study identified that there was a disconnect between the government/FRS and the public 

in terms of what they referred to as ‘risk tolerance’. This was most evident in attitude to injuries. 

Official policy seems to place avoidance of any injury as its highest priority and assumes this to also 

be the public’s main motivation and enough to dictate any response to the discovery of a 

dwelling/HMO fire. However, the same study found that almost all those who incurred a minor 

injury accepted it as a reasonable cost in relation to pursuing or achieving their personal priorities. 

Further, they stated, in hindsight, they would do the same again. 

105. This willingness of the public to accept minor injuries to protect loved ones, the home or 

its contents is understandable. This may, on the face of it, seem problematic for 

services trying to avoid this outcome. But the literature and data show these to be well 

established behaviours which policy makers need to work with, rather than against. 

21 

19

106. It is a dilemma found in many other areas, where a balance must be found between personal 

freedom and risk. Generally, it is accepted that people may choose to incur reasonable risk to 

themselves but should avoid placing others at risk through the consequences of their actions. 

107. Numerous every day and discretionary activities carry similar or higher levels of risk to those 

resulting from using an extinguisher. DIY and sport for example are frequently responsible for 

injuries or even fatalities. In response, the government and industry seek to help make products 

safer or provide advice. This is preferred to denying people the option to participate in either 

activity by withdrawing public access to tools or sports equipment, which would be a last resort, 

and unpopular, option. The benefits achieved by the public using extinguishers are significant, 

given the potential for a fire to otherwise lead to detrimental and life-changing outcomes. A low 

and calculated level of personal risk willingly accepted by an individual tackling a fire can avoid, or 

reduce, a much higher risk to others should they ignore the fire and allow it to develop. Where 

current guidance discourages the provision of extinguishers in public spaces, this policy is neither 

supported by the evidence or justifiable through a consensus from the public. Rather it is imposed 

on them and is inconsistent with other approaches to public health. 

108. As well as the evidence of risk presented in this report, there is, of course, an ethical dimension to 

the above that can only be highlighted but not discussed in depth. However, it is clearly important 

to find a proportional and consistent balance between personal freedoms and interventions which 

prevent or limit that ability. Where this is done in the name of public safety, the evidence and case 

should be robust and transparent. 

The myth of panic 

109. Despite the media’s enthusiasm for portraying the public as prone to panicking when faced with 

an emergency, the literature does not support this. This was found to be true for dwelling/HMO 

fires and by others who have studied the public’s response to emergencies. 

‘People’s disaster response actions differ significantly from disaster myths that commonly 

portray victims as dazed, panicked, or disorganised.’ (Fischer, 2008). ‘Instead, most people 

respond adaptively, albeit somewhat delayed because normalcy bias stimulates 

confirmation (milling) before initiating protective action.’ (Lindell, 2013). 

110. In another study, the influence of the media in promoting the idea of a panic response was 

highlighted, but it concluded that, ‘After five decades studying scores of disasters…one of the 

strongest findings is that people rarely lose control’. (Clarke, 2002: 21). 

111. The Kerslake Arena Review (2018: 212), following the Manchester bombing also commented 

positively on the public contribution to the response. 

‘The Panel found that many unsung heroes played an important role in providing first aid, 

care and reassurance and in assisting with moving people from the foyer to the Casualty 

Clearing Station. In addition to members of the public who ran to help, staff with 

no formal remit in this role selflessly and bravely did their best to provide care 

and support and undoubtedly made an important contribution to the response. 

Others also played a part away from the Arena whether providing shelter in 

local hotels or donating food and drink. Every one of them is owed a debt of 

gratitude.’ 

22 

0

112. That people’s behaviour changes in response to a threat and that they may experience some 

distress, does not mean they are not rational or capable. Emotions have understandably been 

shown to play a strong role in the public’s response and experience of a fire or emergency (as they 

can for professionals). But this does not incapacitate the public in terms of taking rational and 

beneficial self-appointed actions. 

113. Their concern for, and desire to help others is not lost to selfish behaviour, beyond a few 

exceptional and, generally extreme, circumstances. However, in most dwelling/HMO fires the 

threat is low to moderate and the public exercise sensible and appropriate risk judgement, 

achieving positive outcomes for themselves and others. 

The public response versus official advice 

114. ‘Government policy seeks to improve fire safety in the home, reducing the incidence of fire and 

associated injuries and deaths’ (English Housing Survey 2015: 13). 

115. This policy appears to dominate official fire safety guidance and advice in multiple guises. Whilst it 

is an important focus, it has already been shown that it does not reflect the full range of public 

aspirations in relation to dwelling/HMO fire outcomes. 

116. Furthermore, it does not seem to offer any view on whether there are specific priorities for 

interventions within a range of injuries, which extend from the very minor to serious or fatal. This 

simplistic tendency to treat all injuries the same is reflected in other areas of fire safety. It masks 

the need to recognise the different risk characteristics and behaviours associated with various 

injury types. Rather than being seen in generic terms, each will require different strategies and 

interventions to engage the relevant groups. The evidence shows that a reliance on the FRS 

response time is not an appropriate focus or strategy to achieve this. 

117. The policy also fails to accord with the public who have been shown to be tolerant, or accepting, of 

the incurrence of minor injuries in pursuit of their personal priorities. It is important to 

acknowledge that the public will trade off some injury risk (or occurrence) for the attainment of 

personally valued rewards. In not recognising, or aiding this process, the public may be put at 

greater risk. For example, if an appropriate means of tackling the fire (extinguisher) is not readily 

available, they will improvise with whatever they can, which can cause delay in tackling the fire or 

mean using something that is unsuitable for the task. 

118. Reflecting official policy, national and local fire safety messaging has, for some time, urged the 

public, on discovering a fire in the home, to ‘get out, stay out and call us out’, ‘Don’t put yourself at 

risk’, ‘Never tackle a fire yourself’ and ‘Leave it to the professionals’. 

119. This paternalistic messaging confirms the government and FRS’ belief that a professional response 

is the only intervention capable of safely tackling dwelling/HMO fires. Again, this starkly contrasts 

with the reality that between 70% and 80% of dwelling fires are tackled effectively and at low risk, 

by the public. The public success in extinguishing fires and, in most cases, avoiding any injury is 

something that should be worthy of greater study. In that way it would be possible to 

develop relevant messaging based on positive actions the public can adopt to tackle the 

fire and stay safe. Improving the relevance and usefulness of the advice to the target 

group in this way may help close the gap between official guidance and what people 

actually do. 

23 

1

120. Surveys from the National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors (NAFED) in America reveals 

the same trend of public firefighting, with even higher percentages not needing the FRS. 

‘In both the 1979 and 1985 surveys, the fire department was only called for 13% of the 

reported fires. In the 1996 survey, the fire department was called in 24% of the reported 

fires. However, in the 2010 survey the number dropped to 17% of the time’. And ‘These 

results are not unique to NAFED surveys. A 1978 publication by the U.S. Department of 

Commerce stated that about 90% of fires in households are not reported, based on their 

survey of 33,000 fires.’ (NAFED, 2010: 9) 

121. Dwelling/HMO fires have a very personal impact, and it is not surprising that most people are 

strongly motivated to try and tackle it themselves. The importance attached to people, pets, and 

possessions is again emphasised. Any policy or intervention which fails to recognise this will be 

ineffective from the start and may leave the public exposed to greater and avoidable risks. 

122. In fact, if the public did follow official advice, it is unlikely that the FRS would welcome or be able 

to deal with a potential increase of up to 500% in calls to attend dwelling/HMO fires. The policy 

default of assuming every fire is immediately high risk is evidently untrue both in practice, and in 

the public assessment. Fortunately, the public use their own initiative to assess which fires they 

can tackle and when to call the FRS. And yet they are still not aided in this process as any 

professional guidance continues to be withheld in favour of repeating the ‘get out…’ message. In 

that respect, the public are an integral but invisible, and neglected, part of the response to 

dwelling/HMO fires. For those who do so, calling the FRS is usually the penultimate action, after 

various self-appointed investigation, mitigation, or preservation tasks. 

123. A recent study also showed that the public do not just get out, with 49% never leaving the 

property during the fire. Whilst this may surprise or concern many professionals, it is likely to be 

explained by a difference between the fire as perceived by professionals and the lived experience 

of the public. There is nothing to suggest that the public routinely take unnecessary risks. A more 

likely explanation is that the fire was small and not sufficiently well-developed to pose an 

imminent injury or life threat. As such, they were able to remain in the premises safely and 

relatively comfortably, which is supported by the evidence in relation to the majority of fires not 

spreading beyond the item first ignited or the room of origin. Inclement weather or other factors 

may also make remaining in the premises a safer or more comfortable option. Fires, like other 

emergencies, must also be understood in human terms. 

124. Not only do many people not leave the premises, but a further group (21%) will re-enter one or 

more times having initially exited. This is not something which is recognised in guidance or 

standards but is an evidenced and rational behaviour. Again, in most cases this is not due to 

reckless risk taking by the public but a sensible (and intuitive) assessment that the conditions 

present a low level of risk. They will then exit and re-enter as they undertake their various tasks 

(investigation, warning, firefighting, salvage, etc.). 

125. For some, re-entering may even result from a sense of frustration during what can be, or just 

seem, a long wait for the FRS, if called. Current FRS procedures typically do not retain 

communications with those at the scene between the conclusion of the 999 call and 

appliances arriving. Sometimes, a change in circumstances may dictate the need for 

urgent action before the FRS arrives, or the urge to ‘do something’ is overwhelming. 

Not much is known about this group but again these nuances highlight the need to 

move away from a generic and assumption-led behavioural model. 

24 

2

126. In summary, there is a significant difference between official assumptions/guidance and actual 

public behaviour. However, the government and FRS seek to deter this behaviour, and, in 

singularly promoting their ‘get out’ message, they exclude recognition of any other course of 

action or advice. What is clear is that limited numbers follow their advice and ignoring it may even 

provide better outcomes for most. Many policies in this area are demonstrably failing and need to 

better reflect the public’s priorities and the contribution. 

How the public tackle fires 

127. Despite tackling most dwelling/HMO fires, little is known about the public’s experience in doing so. 

Further, there seems to be limited and sporadic interest from academia or the fire sector in 

researching this subject, particularly in terms of building a detailed and objective knowledge of 

how the public tackle fires. 

128. For example, the FRS does not publish (or possibly even record) information regarding any 

attempts to tackle the fire prior to their arrival at those they are called to. This is a missed and 

readily available opportunity to capture important data, particularly when they arrive to find the 

fire already extinguished. Equally, where they arrive to find an active fire, understanding what took 

place before and its impact on the circumstances of the fire would be insightful not just for 

operational reasons, but to enhance professional knowledge. Capturing this would aid them and 

others to drive forward public safety. The general lack of curiosity or professional interest in the 

public’s capability and experience undermines the relevance and effectiveness of many fire safety 

arrangements. 

129. Encouragingly, a recent study made an important start on understanding the fire conditions the 

public encountered at different stages of interaction with a dwelling/HMO fire. For example, the 

flame size and smoke volume when they entered a room and when they exited. From this, some 

insight could be gained into the potential risk and how the public assess it. Much more remains to 

be done on this topic, but if progressed, it would make a meaningful contribution to a range of 

areas, e.g. improving risk communication between the services and the public. 

130. Studies also identify other findings which differ from official guidance. For example, they show that 

the most common way in which the public are alerted to something being different (i.e. before 

they know it is a fire), is through either smelling or seeing smoke. Actuation of a smoke alarm was 

third, accounting for about one third of occurrences. It is known that the public’s initial response is 

typically to investigate and then undertake a range (between one and 11, with an average of five) 

of other actions. This typically includes tackling the fire. Their response behaviour is the same 

regardless of how they are first made aware of the fire or its effects. 

131. The public are likely to encounter a fire that is relatively small and often contained to the item first 

ignited. They are often present when it starts, e.g. whilst cooking. The evidence also suggests that 

very few fires develop rapidly in the way perhaps anticipated by legislation and fire models. 

132. The EHS and BCS do not describe the way in which individual fires were tackled by the public 

or the FRS but do identify what fire safety measures the respondents had in their 

homes, including extinguishers. During the period 2002/03 to 2016/17, fire extinguisher 

ownership fell from 18% to 11%, possibly due to official discouragement. In not having 

access to purpose-designed equipment, it is likely most would have used water as an 

extinguishing medium and applied it by means of improvising with household items. 

25 

3

133. A 2003 UK survey found that private houses accounted for only 3.3% of extinguisher use. However, 

across all categories of location, extinguishers were successful in extinguishing 79.9% of fires, which 

seems to correlate with the dwelling fire data. It reported that 58.6% were operated by trained 

staff, 36.4% were operated by untrained staff and in 5% of incidents, this was unknown. Data from 

the National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors (NAFED) provides even more robust 

validation of the influence of fire extinguishers as used by ‘ordinary civilians’. 

‘The combined results of the 34 years of data are based on the performance of 32,756 fire 

extinguishers used on 13,453 incidents. Of the 13,221 fire incidents reported, portable fire 

extinguishers successfully extinguished 12,505 fires (95%).’ (NAFED 2010: 2) 

134. As previously identified, the government/FRS policy is to actively deter attempts at firefighting by 

the public, in favour of a default to the professional response model. This has wide ranging 

consequences including for those who call 999. Even where someone is determined to do so, the 

FRS will not give them any advice on how to tackle a fire. Instead, it will repeat its advice to get out 

and wait for the professionals, unless it deems there is an immediate risk to life, in which case, it 

provides advice on how to avoid the effects of the fire (fire survival guidance). But in either case, 

the FRS will not share its expertise to help the public to tackle a fire more safely or effectively. 

135. Once the FRS has the information it requires, they will end the call. This then leaves the caller and 

those present unsupported until the physical arrival of the FRS. From a risk management 

perspective, this seems an unusual and obvious gap. Despite being aware of a high-risk event 

(accounting for most recorded fire injuries), and which is still in a dynamic stage, the FRS has no risk 

mitigation interventions for this period, other than rushing to the scene. From a service design 

perspective, this means there is a neglected, and yet critical, risk period averaging nearly eight 

minutes. During this period, the incident is left to develop without professional influence. This 

omission is hard to understand either from a risk management approach or in recognition of the 

increasing capability of technology to bridge the gap between remote operations. 

136. Studies also identify that the public experience time differently depending on what they are doing. 

They underestimate how long they spent when active with tasks and overestimate how long passes 

when they are in a passive state, e.g. waiting for help. Again, from a risk management and guidance 

perspective this is important because it will influence their decisions and behaviours. 

137. Historically, FRS policies did include the provision of advice to the public in terms of how to tackle a 

fire, whether as a free service or for some as a commercial proposition. Anecdotally, the current 

policy of withholding advice seems to be primarily due to a concern that the FRS could be sued if 

the person following their advice incurs an injury. By not providing advice the FRS believe it avoids 

that organisational risk, even though it may leave the public exposed to otherwise avoidable 

injuries. If true, this is a perverse logic for a service aimed at enhancing public safety. Given the 

established and beneficial nature of public interventions to tackle fires, the default of repeating ‘get 

out’ to avoid injuries ignores the reality of the evidence of the public’s motivations and behaviours. 

The health sector may well offer ready-made solutions for progressing this issue given its 

experience in providing critical life and health advice by remote means, e.g. phone. 

26 

4

Portable fire extinguishers 

Introduction 

138. It is assumed that most readers will be familiar with the relevant legislation and guidance regarding 

portable fire extinguishers (see Bibliography). 

139. In combination, the legislation, standards and guidance, etc., are the instruments used to support 

the ability to create fire-safe premises. They include prescriptive requirements as well as providing 

scope for judgement/contextual application, usually through the process of industry guidance and 

tools, such as a risk assessment. 

140. Where bibliographies are provided in the guidance documents, they primarily or exclusively refer 

to other technical guidance or standards. There is a notable absence of qualitative academic 

studies, referenced data sources or social science contributions relating to real life events. This 

observation tends to suggest that this type of evidence does not seem to be formally recognised or 

influential in the fire safety regulation and advice domain. This may reflect the fact that fire safety 

and its related fields are typically seen as and dominated by engineering-oriented professionals and 

related disciplines. 

141. This relationship is recognised by British Approvals for Fire Equipment (BAFE) which observes, 

‘It is not expected that the fire risk assessor will have the skills of a behavioural 

psychologist. However, whilst most other aspects of fire safety are concerned with physical 

or system-based issues, understanding human behaviour in the event of a fire is an 

essential part of the knowledge of a fire risk assessor’s role.’ (2011: 13) 

This is then qualified by several requirements including, ‘To enable the fire risk assessor to carry 

out the above, the fire risk assessor should; Be aware of current professional thinking and practical 

guidance on human behaviour in fire, including case studies.’ (2011: 13) 

142. Similar acknowledgements appear in various guises in other publications. However, the study of 

human behaviour and related social science approaches are a distinct and specialist discipline. And 

one in which a broad range of expertise is available. Given the fundamental importance of human 

behaviour, it is not clear to what extent and by what means the fire safety sector actively fulfils the 

requirement to have a current and sufficient knowledge, either at a national or individual level. 

Certainly, the composition of committees, bibliographies of key standards and codes and some of 

the issues raised by this report strongly suggest that the engineering expertise needs to be 

enhanced by ensuring that human behaviour/social science perspectives are represented and 

influential throughout the fire safety system. 

143. The influence of major fires/case studies is also noted for their tendency to inflate awareness of 

rare and memorable events rather than put them in context of more typical incidents. This again 

can have a distorting effect on how people perceive risk. 

28 

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The role of portable fire extinguishers 

144. The role of the fire extinguisher appears to be generally regarded as that of a first aid fire-fighting 

appliance suited to tackling small fires. Either to deploy against contained fires, or for a quick 

intervention against one that is still developing. However, terms such as ‘small’ are of course 

subjective and will vary in interpretation between individuals and within the context of a specific 

fire. Whether there is a good correlation between the meaning of these terms as used in fire safety 

publications and in practice by the public is not clear. 

145. Recognition of the valuable role of extinguishers came from a 2003 report which concluded, ‘Fire 

extinguishers are designed to prevent relatively minor incidents becoming major conflagrations.’ It 

is, of course, difficult to prove how many and which fires would have developed to pose a serious 

risk if not tackled and contained early on. Events such as the Grenfell fire are a reminder of the 

consequences when this happens. 

146. It would be inappropriate to comment in detail on the Grenfell fire. However, it is important to 

learn from all fires, and whether a fire was contained or not, the contribution of the public and 

portable extinguishers should be routinely recorded. Over time, the data would highlight both the 

critical risks and the opportunities for effectively intervening to prevent catastrophic fire spread. 

147. For professionals, compliance with industry regulations and standards in terms of fire extinguisher 

provision can be important objectives. Given their influence, it is useful to understand how the 

guidance anticipates the extinguisher may be used at a practical level. Within the various 

publications, there appear to be three underpinning principles relating to the use of extinguishers. 

To protect the escape route 

148. As would be expected, government policy and the widespread assumption that the singular aim of 

the public is, or should be, to quickly get out of a premises when encountering a fire, is reflected in 

the relevant standards and guides. 

149. Both the legislation and standards/code of practice typically identify the fundamental role of the 

portable fire extinguishers as being to protect escape routes from the effects of fire. This is 

expected to facilitate evacuation and discourage people from deviating from escape routes. 

150. For example, BS 5306-8 encourages their prominent use on escape routes and specifically 

discourages installation where a fire could compromise access to them. It also cautions against use 

in locations that are not on an exit unless it is required for a specific hazard. 

151. The ‘Fire safety in shared or rented accommodation’ guide does not make any reference to tackling 

a fire or the provision/use of portable fire extinguishers but offers the following advice to the 

public: ‘Plan an escape route and make sure everyone knows how to escape. It could save your 

life.’ 

152. In relation to dwellings/HMO the public seem to disagree. It does not appear that data in relation 

to the use of escape plans is routinely collected following a fire, even to inform campaign 

evaluations. However, periodic surveys identify that only 5% – 7% of households had 

prepared an escape plan. Neither does it accord with the research regarding risk profiles 

which identifies that those at greatest risk of dying are typically unable to respond 

(through physical or mental impairment) to the fire cues. As such, an escape plan is 

unlikely to be an appropriate option for this group. 

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To avoid injury 

153. The disparity between government/professional policy and the public in relation to injuries has 

already been outlined. It is reiterated that avoidance of an injury (minor) in most dwelling/HMO 

fires is not a key driver for the public, even in retrospect when asked if they would do anything 

differently. Despite this, there are frequent references in the various guides to this being an aim 

that extinguishers can facilitate. The removal or non-provision of extinguishers in HMOs may even 

increase the risk of injury to the public. This results from increased time to source a means of 

fighting the fire and the risk of using improvised rather than purpose-designed equipment. 

154. There is also a wider cost/benefit dimension. In exposing themselves to the low likelihood of a 

minor injury, the fire extinguisher user is likely to extinguish or potentially delay the fire 

development. In doing so, they may reduce the subsequent risk to many others including 

professional responders. Thus, the risk exposure is moderate and tolerable in relation to the 

benefit achievable, including avoiding a higher risk to greater numbers of people. 

A default position of ‘do not trust the public’ 

155. The view regarding the general public’s capability is to some extent ambiguous and conflicting in 

the various documents. Overall, it tends towards a default position of not trusting them to use 

extinguishers, with many publications specifically stating this as a reason not to install them. 

156. It is not clear what the origin or continued justification is for this distrust of the public’s capability. 

Studies consistently demonstrate this view to be incorrect. No information was found (or provided 

in response to enquiries made) of the specific evidence base used to justify the advice that it is 

unsafe for untrained members of the public to use extinguishers. Whilst sources were limited, the 

available survey data and literature overwhelmingly identified the opposite to be true. They are 

used safely and effectively by ordinary and untrained members of the public in ways beyond those 

anticipated by legislation and guidance. If evidence to the contrary exists, it should be made 

available or transparent in the appropriate bibliographies. Otherwise, this guidance, wherever it 

appears, must be urgently reviewed and aligned with the evidence as it has the potential to do 

harm if perpetuated without sound justification. It clearly conflicts with the public will, need and 

right to choose for themselves. 

Selection and provision of extinguishers 

157. Occupiers of single private dwellings are of course free to choose what, if any, fire safety measures 

they adopt. But for residents in an HMO, the common areas will be subject to fire safety 

legislation, and through a risk assessment, a decision will be made by third parties whether to 

provide fire extinguishers in these spaces. 

158. Different types (or classes) of fire require the use of an appropriate extinguishing medium. As a 

result, a range of extinguishers are available to choose from. In most cases, the appropriate 

provision of extinguishers (e.g. type, number and location) for a specific premises will usually result 

from professional advice or a risk assessment incorporating a blend of advisory criteria 

and local circumstances. 

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159. To help the end user distinguish between the various extinguishers, a system of standardised 

marking has been adopted. Where the risk profile requires it, there may be different types of 

extinguisher in the same location. Various means exist, e.g. placement, signage and training, by 

which any potential confusion for the end user can be reduced. Another approach to reduce the 

likelihood of confusion is, where appropriate, to provide general purpose extinguishers. 

160. The operation of a fire extinguisher has the potential to create some risks to the user. The 

extinguishing medium of some can present a risk from direct contact during or after use or indirect 

contact (e.g. contact with the horn of a carbon dioxide extinguisher). An inappropriate choice of 

medium could also lead to an adverse reaction between the extinguishing agent and fire, e.g. using 

water on live electrical equipment. Or it could present a risk through an inability to effectively 

extinguish the fire or by allowing it to re-ignite. 

161. The likelihood of these risks or the predicted severity of harm is not clear, due to the lack of data. 

However, these risks are all reduced by the measures applied to the manufacture, supply and 

maintenance of extinguishers identified above. In combination they should ensure that, when 

faced with a fire, the public will find the correct extinguisher in the correct location. Training is 

cited as another means to reduce the risks and is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 

162. Another concern is that the extinguisher will not be available when required, either through theft 

or vandalism. The ‘Housing – fire safety guide’ states: ‘The installation of extinguishers can also 

lead to problems if they are not properly maintained or where equipment is discharged through 

malice or horseplay. For these reasons extinguishers are not recommended inside units of 

accommodation unless there are resident staff who are trained in their use (a caretaker, 

housekeeper, warden or similar).’ 

163. BS 5306-8 also acknowledges the potential for vandalism but does not consider it a significant 

issue. It believes that most extinguishers should be on an escape route and so their absence would 

not put the potential user at enhanced risk. It then identifies that any risk to life would be 

mitigated by other fire safety arrangements or the attendance of the FRS. 

164. Whilst both acknowledge the problem, the difference in guidance is stark, and the BS 5306-8 

seems the more logical and measured approach. However, there does not seem to be any 

compelling evidence to identify the presence, scale or nature of the suggested problem. Neither it 

is there evidence to suggest that the absence of an expected extinguisher or the failure of one to 

operate presents a significant risk to life, or of causing an injury. 

165. Possibly, the assumption is that in the absence of an extinguisher, people will just evacuate the 

premises in line with official advice. However, studies suggest that the public are in fact likely to 

find another extinguisher or an alternative means to tackle the fire. Having decided on a task, or 

course of action, they will typically persevere and find a way to achieve it unless the circumstances 

render it impossible. 

166. Other cost-effective options for reducing the potential for vandalism or theft, which do not impede 

the provision of fire extinguishers, include measures such as CCTV and secure access 

arrangements. Both are frequently found for general security in common areas and can 

be used to monitor fire safety equipment. Specific solutions such as tracking technology 

provide a viable option for active management to reduce the potential for theft. 

Alternatively, the fire safety provision can anticipate some degree of inoperability and 

incorporate a degree of redundancy allowance. But there are multiple alternative 

solutions that do not result in denying the public access to extinguishers. 

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167. A health parallel to extinguishers is the deployment of automatic external defibrillators in public 

spaces. Recognising that the first few minutes of a cardiac arrest are critical to the outcome, the 

UK and other countries have recently seen a strategy of placing these portable devices in locations 

where they can be immediately accessed by the public (untrained users). User-centred design 

ensures that they are simple to operate with remote assistance provided via the 999 call. Concerns 

about vandalism were also cited but instead of halting a life-saving programme, they have 

continued to ensure the equipment is available. It is accepted that, even if occasionally one is not 

available, the majority will be, and these make an invaluable contribution. 

Training 

168. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 sec 21 states that the responsible person must 

make sure that employees are given training to ‘include suitable and sufficient instruction and 

training on the appropriate precautions and actions to be taken by the employee in order to 

safeguard himself and other relevant persons on the premises.’ 

169. It does not specifically identify training as a necessity in relation to the use of portable fire 

extinguishers. In the absence of a legal duty, the issue of whether training is required then 

becomes a discretionary one. It is in some of the codes of practice and similar documents that the 

idea of training as essential is created. 

170. For example, following revision, PAS 79 was recently published as two codes of practice, part 1 

being for ‘Premises other than Housing’ and part 2 for ‘Housing’. The documents both positively 

recognise the role of the extinguisher. However, in part 2 (which applies to housing), it advises 

against the provision of extinguishers where untrained users may access them. The justification 

given is that doing these users may pose a risk to themselves or others when tackling a fire. In part 

1, the opposite applies and the risk to the user or others is not accepted as a justifiable reason for 

not providing extinguishers. On a human level the difference in advice is both confusing and 

counter intuitive. People will take more risk to protect their homes than they would a place of 

work and yet this guidance advises the opposite and does not accord with established human 

traits. 

171. Any risk assessor who considers ignoring the advice, in either case, is strongly cautioned against 

doing so and is expected to provide a justification for their decision. Conversely, compliance with 

the code of practice requires no justification. Given their influential role, it is crucial then that this 

and other guidance is fully and transparently evidenced. Where advice reflects professional 

opinion and is not corroborated by evidence then this must be explicitly stated. 

172. The bibliography for parts 1 or 2 did not suggest any evidence source which may inform the strong 

direction given. They are both limited to listing technical documents and do not include any 

surveys or social science studies. As such, the underpinning evidence for such important advice 

remains unclear. 

173. It is also important to understand how the content and forceful tone of the advice is 

understood by risk assessors and other users of the guidance, on a human level. The 

important influence of human factors is becoming much widely appreciated, having 

developed from the aviation sector. In this regard, suitable consideration must be 

given to the intended, and potential unintended, consequences of any directives. 

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174. BS 5306-8 considers that encountering a fire could cause distress which may impair the decisionmaking 

of even someone who has had appropriate training. Whilst studies refute the idea of panic, 

it is not unreasonable to acknowledge that stress could impair normal abilities to some extent. But 

this statement by BS 5306-8 suggests a lack of confidence in prior training as the solution. A view 

reinforced in the same document when it discusses training and cautions that this does not 

provide sufficient experience for encountering a real fire. Most people will rarely encounter an 

uncontrolled fire and this, along with the different experience it creates to simulated or contained 

fires created for training purposes, mean that their response to the two may differ. It is likely that 

these considerations are more relevant to the few fires which are larger than expected or are 

developing rapidly. However, as the data has revealed, these are few and seem to be decreasing in 

number and proportion. Here, again, any discussion should recognise the most likely fires people 

will encounter rather than a default to the rare and worst-case scenario. 

175. Compared to many items routinely used in everyday life, extinguishers are relatively simple and 

easy to operate. Most fire safety publications seem to recognise this to be the case, with British 

Standard 5306-8 adding the caveat that, they should be installed and maintained appropriately. In 

fact, there are many examples of items with comparable or greater technical complexity which 

pose serious risks, e.g. power tools for which training could be beneficial but is not mandatory. 

176. The method of safely tackling a fire is also something which can be covered in training. This can 

provide an opportunity to use an extinguisher in controlled conditions allowing users to see how 

different extinguishers discharge. Whilst a jet of water coming from an extinguisher will not 

surprise most people, the use of dry powder or carbon dioxide may, because of the sounds and 

sight as it is operated. Familiarisation with this is clearly useful, but no data was found which 

suggests that it represents a significant risk or that training would reduce it. 

177. Training also provides an opportunity to demonstrate how a fire responds to different 

extinguishing media. Evidence identifies that the public are tackling dwelling/HMO fires regularly, 

successfully and at low risk using improvised means. Hence, the act of tackling a fire does not seem 

to pose any training need. 

178. Studies relating to the need for, or impact of training are scarce. However, between 2010 and 

2012, Eastern Kentucky University and Worcester Polytechnic Institute conducted a joint study on 

the effectiveness of ordinary people using portable fire extinguishers, and the impact of a minimal 

amount of training, involving 276 participants. The study concluded that ‘the ordinary person is 

able to use a fire extinguisher without hurting themselves or others’, and that ‘participants are 

able to use a fire extinguisher with great effectiveness.’ (2012: 3) 

179. It further found, 

‘Almost three-quarters (74%) used proper technique of aiming at the base of the fire and 

used a back and forth motion until the fire was extinguished. On average, users discharged 

the extinguishers in 13.4 seconds. After just a few minutes of training, 100% of the 

participants pulled the pin, squeezed the trigger, and discharged the extinguisher, with 96% 

aiming at the base of the fire and sweeping back and forth.’ (undated factsheet) 

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180. The results from this study are helpful in supporting other evidence source that show that the 

public are not reliant on training to use extinguishers safely and effectively. However, it remains 

the case that whether for research or training, it is hard to fully create the conditions of a real fire. 

As such, the reaction of someone to either event may differ, and it is not clear whether one 

predicts the other. Pursuing this discussion in generic terms is unhelpful and more needs to be 

done to understand the difference between a fire that poses little, if any risk, and those with the 

potential to develop and pose a significant risk. 

181. Most dwelling/HMO fires pose a low and tolerable risk to those that encounter them. The evidence 

shows they are being dealt with effectively, and by people without training or even specialised firefighting 

equipment. There are of course options to further reduce the risks for this group, but 

these do not seem to be a priority. However, there may be opportunities to enhance the market 

for domestic fire-fighting equipment by encouraging adoption of extinguishers suited to a domestic 

environment to reduce reliance on improvised equipment. Instead, an urgent focus should 

examine why some fires develop to create higher risk and what their characteristics are. This is an 

area that has the potential to make the greatest contribution to reducing the harm from 

dwelling/HMO fires and is in need of user-centred and targeted interventions. 

182. Overall, the case for training being critical for the safe use of extinguishers (and conversely using a 

lack of training to justify their non-provision) requires greater scrutiny. Understanding what 

difference training makes, what it should include and how often it is required are key questions. 

These, in turn, inform whether it is required and, if so, the burden it places on 

businesses/organisations because of the scope, duration and frequency required to maintain 

competence. If the burden is perceived to be unnecessarily high, then from a financial, if not public 

safety perspective, it may become attractive not to provide extinguishers. But available evidence 

clearly identifies that extinguishers are being used safely and effectively by untrained persons. 

Advice to the contrary should be considered unsound unless there is relevant and robust evidence 

to justify its continuation. Removing, or not installing extinguishers, is not a neutral act. It must be 

one made from sound evidence and risk management practice if it is to improve, and not be 

detrimental to, public safety. 

183. Despite this lack of evidence, the requirement for training and the risks to untrained users appear 

to be widely promoted within professional fields in the UK. 

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Research and data 

184. The point has been made that the evidence base for some of the fire safety publications is not 

always clear in relation to portable fire extinguishers, or that it tends to draw on a limited range of 

material. Consideration of why this is the case is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is 

appropriate to discuss evidential material relating to dwelling/HMO fires and portable fire 

extinguishers in general and to highlight some of the sources that could enhance legislation, 

guidance, and risk assessments. Some of these exist already but are possibly not being referenced. 

Others are not available but would provide valuable insight. 

185. In all professions, academic literature is a core source of knowledge, but fire, unlike crime and 

health, attracts limited and sporadic interest. Despite various attempts to do so, it still suffers from 

the absence of a national and co-ordinated research strategy or capability. Many important 

knowledge gaps remain unexamined, in part due to the limited stimulus to initiate work and partly 

through the difficulty of working with the sector. 

186. Despite the complexities involved in fire safety issues, there is also a reliance on a relatively 

narrow range of academic disciplines, with engineering tending to dominate. Greater use of other 

fields, e.g. social sciences, would be insightful and help to narrow the gap between the perceived 

and real world. 

187. There is also a tendency towards deductive studies (starting with a hypothesis and then testing it) 

and examining issues through the lens of current policy and assumptions. Studies using the 

grounded theory method (start with the evidence and then construct a theory) are rarer. This is 

true of research in relation to dwelling/HMO fires and fire extinguishers. Both approaches are 

necessary, but the limited use of the grounded theory method may restrict an appreciation of 

different perspectives, such as that of the public and, in turn, impair policy innovation. 

188. Despite this, there is a valuable supply of material available for incorporation into standards and 

guidance publications. However, as with any evidence, it should be assessed for its quality, any 

influences and to identify further research needs. Whilst the issues in relation to commissioning 

new research have been outlined above, it is important to at least be transparent and informed 

about what is known and where assumptions have been made. 

189. In addition to literature, data provides an important pool of evidence. Routine administrative data 

is one useful source, as it is available during everyday operations. For those involved in the fire 

safety sector, this includes information available throughout the life cycle of risk assessments, 

commissioning, servicing and use of extinguishers. For the FRS, this includes fire safety planning 

work and attending fires. Some relevant data is collected but generally relates to the service 

providers interests rather than seeking to capture the experience and contribution of other 

parties, including the public. 

190. If undertaken in a structured and co-ordinated manner, it is entirely feasible to routinely collect 

data which would provide primary and cohesive evidence of the customer’s end-to-end 

needs and experience. In this sense, ‘customer’ is used to describe someone who uses 

commercial services as well as a user of a public sector service, e.g. someone who calls 

the FRS. 

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191. Currently, risk assessments appear to be lacking relevant and up to date knowledge of some safety 

critical issues including the decisions and actions taken by the public when tackling a fire. For 

example, were fire extinguishers present and used or not? If not, was anything else used to tackle 

the fire? how effective were these at tackling the fire? what are type and rates of injury associated 

with different scenarios? how many people had formal training on firefighting, and what influence 

did that have on effectiveness/injuries? This type of information seems essential to know before 

meaningful and credible advice can be given to the public and to inform fire safety strategies and 

risk assessments. 

192. As well as ongoing data collection, sample surveys created for a specific task are also useful in 

providing a snapshot. Their value can be further enhanced when they are undertaken periodically 

to track trends and changes. 

193. Between research and data there is a vicious cycle at play. The absence of data recording the 

public’s experience, in turn, limits visibility of the public’s experience and contribution, which, in 

turn, hides recognition of the need for academic research. Academia is, in general, poorly engaged 

with fire-related issues, and whilst major events attract some interest, the everyday emergencies 

do not. As such, academia is not driving the need for new data to underpin studies, nor does the 

sector seem to provide sufficient incentives for it to do so. 

194. Where there is an absence of evidence, there will be a need to apply some professional judgement 

to make assumptions. This is sensible, but good practice would see these made explicit. In 

combination with transparency in the selection and use of evidence, the potential for false 

assumptions to become embedded and unchallenged would be greatly reduced. 

195. Footnote: Being evidence-based is increasingly an expectation and aspiration for many 

organisations (for example, the National Fire Chiefs Council). However, achieving it requires a 

strategy, sustained commitment and specialist skills. Fortunately, there are sources of guidance 

and support available, and it is important that recognised methods are used at all points of the 

evidence cycle. For example, the quality of evidence varies, and tools such as evidence standards 

are useful in guiding decision makers on how to understand the merits and limitations of specific 

types. 

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Key findings, discussion, and recommendations 

196. This report has taken a public and human perspective towards understanding the role of portable 

fire extinguishers. A summary of the key findings, along with a discussion and recommendations 

are set out below. 

Defining a good outcome 

Findings 

197. The evidence shows that a public-informed perspective of what constitutes a good outcome 

includes a broad range of objectives. For individuals, this will be very much determined by their 

specific and contemporary circumstances, which only they will be aware of. 

198. The public’s priorities include avoidance of embarrassment or inconvenience; limiting damage to 

their premises including avoiding the need for rehousing; avoiding or limiting the severity of 

injuries (although they will accept minor injuries in pursuit of achieving their goals); saving people, 

pets and valued possessions; and avoiding or minimising the longer-term consequences including 

emotional wellbeing and consequential vulnerability. 

199. There are multiple stakeholders within the fire safety environment, and each will have their own 

needs, but the public perspective is poorly known and represented in professional forums. 

Discussion 

200. The public’s needs and perspective in relation to their desired outcomes following a dwelling/HMO 

fire appears poorly represented in literature, policy, and practice. Officials and professionals tend 

to focus on the immediate, observable, and quantifiable damage whilst the public have a better 

appreciation of its impact and consequences, both at the time and in the longer term. The 

outcomes desired by the public are rational and, if achieved, are likely to reduce the cost (in the 

widest sense) to those affected, whether directly or indirectly. The public are also unlikely to 

change their behaviours, and it would be counter-productive to continue attempting to do so, 

without finding ways to help them address their concerns. 

201. The best opportunity to meet the outcomes desired by the public is in minimising the effect of the 

fire products (fire, heat, and smoke). However, studies identify that even with fires considered 

minor, there can be life changing effects, and so how fires are tackled is an important but 

underappreciated consideration. 

202. Until the public’s requirements in terms of desired outcomes are fully understood and 

incorporated, any fire safety strategy or risk management plan (including those relating to 

portable fire extinguishers) can, at best, only be partially effective. Equally, no matter how 

professionals assess their own performance, failure to acknowledge and contribute towards 

achieving the public’s aspirations means many of the real costs following a dwelling/HMO fire 

remain hidden, yet influential. 

Recommendation 1 

203. Policy makers and professionals should recognise, and actively aid achievement of the 

outcomes that the public seek when encountering a dwelling fire. 

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Characteristics of dwelling fires 

Findings 

204. There has been a substantial and sustained reduction in the number of dwelling/HMO fires, both 

for fires attended by the FRS and for those dealt with by the public. Therefore, the chance of 

having a dwelling/HMO fire is lower, even allowing for the increase in the number of households 

and population size over the same time. 

205. Most dwelling/HMO fires are relatively small, with the majority not going beyond the item first 

ignited and few extending beyond the room of origin. The average area of damage caused by the 

fire is also reducing and financial losses are often minimal. There is no need for the FRS to attend 

these. Future risk communication and advice to the public should seek to help them understand in 

what circumstances the FRS should be called. 

206. There is evidence to suggest that the use of standard fire growth models in relation to 

dwelling/HMO fires needs further research to assess their alignment with observations or data 

from real events. 

207. The FRS response time to all fires and dwelling fires has increased substantially from 5 minutes and 

33 seconds in 1994/95 to 7 minutes and 47 seconds. 

Discussion 

208. The characteristics of dwelling fires have been shown to be continually changing with the data 

identifying a trend of fewer and smaller fires. The causes of this are unknown but are likely to be 

due to multiple factors. However, there is an opportunity to understand the changing nature of 

risk and identify relationships indicated by these and other sources of data. This must incorporate 

what is known about the fires dealt with by the public. 

209. It is reasonable to assume that the FRS data is likely to represent the more serious fires where 

those present felt the situation could escalate or was already beyond their ability to manage. And 

yet, even allowing for pre-call activity, the FRS response time and then the period until an effective 

intervention is made, the fires rarely extend beyond the item or room of origin. This challenges the 

idea that all or even most fires represent a serious risk of injury to the public. 

210. The size of fire data and number of fires dealt with by the public also demonstrates that the public 

can deal with most fires and, in doing so, will achieve the best outcome. This should be the default 

assumption for planning and guidance. However, little is known about when and why they decide 

to call the FRS. Ideally, they would call as soon as they recognised a situation had, or was likely to, 

develop to be beyond their ability to safely tackle. This requires specific and evidence-based 

guidance. Certainly, a structured and evidence-informed assessment model would be a useful 

addition to guide the public when they should call the FRS. This would provide a tiered basis upon 

which the public and FRS could identify and communicate about risks in a meaningful way. 

211. Published data regarding the final size of a fire is useful but does not provide any understanding of 

how the fire developed and over what period. Dwelling/HMO fires are a regular occurrence 

and are usually witnessed by those present. This presents a valuable and relatively easy 

means by which the fire development and its association with other activities 

(e.g. closing doors) could be captured. This could then assess the validity and inform 

the ongoing development of fire growth models. 

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212. Response times do not appear to be influential on the fire size as they have increased over the 

same period, and yet they are still seen as a key performance indicator. The effect is to draw 

resources to attempts at improving the response time rather than looking at what is happening at 

the premises during that period and considering other ways to assist the public prior to arrival, or 

even avoiding the need to attend e.g. remote assistance. 

Recommendation 2 

213. Information from real fires (whether dealt with by the public or the FRS) should be captured to 

develop an evidence-based understanding of fire development. Emphasis should be given to 

understanding the early indicators or specific situations when the public would be placed at risk of 

a serious injury. 

Human Behaviour 

Findings 

214. Dwelling/HMO fires have attracted limited academic research, and, as a result, there are 

significant knowledge gaps. 

215. Not everyone is at the same risk of injury. Most people are unlikely to be at risk of anything more 

than a minor injury, as they can assess and react to their environment, and most dwelling/HMO 

fires pose a low level of risk. 

216. Research finds no evidence of panic in the public and in fact demonstrates a rational and often 

altruistic response. 

217. The public do not follow official advice, which is often to their benefit. 

218. Once they are aware of a fire, the public will undertake several (between one and 11) selfappointed 

tasks including tackling the fire. Often this will be with improvised means. 

219. FRS policies do not recognise the public outcomes or ability and therefore do not routinely offer 

any remote support (via the 999 call) despite considering it a high risk and dynamic event. 

Discussion 

220. There is so much of importance that is known and even more that remains to be researched 

regarding human behaviour when encountering fires. Perhaps, most significantly, it challenges 

many of the negative assumptions about the public that are embedded in legislation, guidance 

and services. The public’s behaviour is typically rational, effective and beneficial. The evidence of 

this cannot keep being ignored in favour of institutional assumptions and paternalism. Yet this 

finding still struggles to find popular acceptance, which has damaging consequences. 

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221. By recognising the motivation and capability of the public, professionals should seek to work with 

their behaviours. Where a specific and unacceptably high risk is identified, officials should work in 

conjunction (co-create) with the public to find ways to reduce or avoid this. But in deciding the 

tolerable balance or risk/reward, regard must be given to seeing this from the public’s perspective 

as well. The level of risk the public experience in most dwelling/HMO fires (and their acceptance of 

incurring minor injuries) is entirely comparable to other everyday activities such as DIY or driving, 

which individuals are free to undertake, the principle being that people should not unreasonably 

endanger others. Tackling a fire generally presents a low risk to those undertaking it but is also an 

activity which can reduce the risk to others if the fire were otherwise allowed to develop. The 

potential for small fires to develop catastrophically remains, as has been seen in several recent 

fires, including the one at Grenfell. The longer the period that lapses until an active intervention is 

made, the greater the risk. Therefore, the early use of portable extinguishers must be considered 

as an essential option in any objective and evidence-based fire safety strategy. 

222. Currently the public are not recognised as the essential component of fire response that they are. 

If the professional services acknowledged them as partners, fire safety could be enhanced or even 

transformed. There is an opportunity to build on the public’s willingness and capability through 

taking a user-centred approach to develop the advice, support and equipment they need. In that 

respect, it is like the model used for cardiac arrest response by placing automated external 

defibrillators in the community and providing remote assistance by phone. It empowers those first 

at the scene to get the best possible outcome until professional response arrives, if required. This 

should be the model and principle for dwelling/HMO fires. 

223. Reframing the relationship with the public would have important consequences for the fire 

extinguisher sector. Not least of which would be to see extinguishers as not just a regulatory 

requirement but something which is valued by the end-user to reduce or avoid the consequences 

of a fire. How the public tackle fires and their experience of using an extinguisher needs greater 

research. But ensuring the public have access to appropriate equipment, such as extinguishers, is 

key. Despite their success in doing so, the public are having to tackle fires with improvised means 

too often. Better aligning extinguisher design and marketing with actual customer behaviour and 

motivations, is likely to create new opportunities to expand the market for them and related 

services. 

224. The use of standards makes an important contribution to the safety and effectiveness of 

extinguishers by providing a minimum criterion. The potential disadvantage is that these can 

discourage or impede innovation. Ideally, all standards should strike a balance between 

maintaining contemporary thresholds whilst encouraging continuous improvement. 

Recommendations 3 and 4 

225. Legislation, standards, guidance and services in relation to fire safety should be better aligned to 

the evidence of the public’s desires, capability and contribution when encountering a 

dwelling/HMO fire. 

226. Human behaviour knowledge, customer feedback programmes and a user-centred approach 

should be adopted to provide new insight into the public’s requirements in terms of fire 

extinguisher design, including their aesthetics. 

42 

0

Extinguishers 

Findings 

227. Standards and guidance in relation to fire safety and fire extinguishers tend to be framed in 

engineering and compliance terms. Academic and human behaviour references are rare. 

228. The role of an extinguisher as stated in guidance is narrow and does not accord with their benefit 

as identified from real fires and the literature. 

229. Concerns about the risk to the public arising from selecting an inappropriate extinguisher or 

because of one being damaged/stolen, are identified in various codes of practice and the recent 

Grenfell Inquiry Phase 1 report. The nature and scale of either is not evidenced and solutions are 

readily available to address both issues. 

230. Training is often cited as an essential safety requirement, and some guides advocate restricting or 

not providing extinguishers solely because untrained personnel are present. And yet, the evidence 

shows extinguishers to be safe and effective. The requirement for, and benefit of training is not 

clear and is certainly insufficient for justifying a policy of using training to determine whether 

extinguishers should be provided or not. 

Discussion 

231. Fire safety guidance and practice is built upon engineering foundations. This brings many 

advantages but may have tended to limit an appreciation or the influence of more social oriented 

or qualitative approaches. The implications of this are seen in numerous areas, the tone and 

content of standards and guidance being obvious ones. In some publications, strong emphasis is 

given to the onus placed on risk assessors should they fail to comply with guidance. If official policy 

and the public’s need/experience aligned, this would be reasonable but in so many areas, the 

evidence demonstrates that it differs. Without appropriate social science or public input 

throughout the policy cycle, this will continue to the detriment of the public and the fire safety 

sector. 

232. The practice of referring to an extinguisher as a first aid device may need re-examining as it is 

potentially misleading. They are rarely used, as suggested in the guidance, just to buy time for 

escape before professional help arrives to extinguish the fire. Instead, the evidence suggests that 

the public discover most dwelling/HMO fires at an early stage, and even by using improvised 

means, they tackle most of them without requiring further assistance. Fire extinguishers, if more 

widely available, would then in most cases be sufficient to deal with the majority of dwelling/HMO 

fires. As such, they are not just a first aid product but are effectively a standalone intervention 

suited to most dwelling/HMO fires. If their contribution and needs are to be recognised, it will be 

crucial to fully adopt this concept. 

43 

1

233. Training in the use of fire extinguishers is a discretionary and not mandatory requirement, and its 

contribution towards reducing the potential risk of using one or enhancing the ability to tackle a 

fire is not clear. In fact, available studies and research find high rates of untrained people safely 

and effectively using extinguishers. This issue matters because some guidance states that 

extinguisher access should be restricted or even denied where those present are not trained. 

Given the evidence about the public ability, fire characteristics and increasing FRS response times, 

this seems hard to justify practically or ethically. Options exist to make relevant information more 

accessible to everyone and not just via formal courses. Alternatively, real-time and on demand 

support could be given to reduce any risks. But their potential for use by untrained personnel is 

not a viable justification to deny the public access to extinguishers. 


234. Social science and customer perspectives need to be better represented in the fire safety sector, 

informing both guidance and practice, including those in relation to fire extinguishers. 

235. The requirement for, and role of training in relation to extinguishers needs to be reviewed. Any 

claims made about the critical role of training should be supported with evidence or rescinded. 

Research and data 

Findings 

236. The fire sector attracts little and sporadic academic interest, resulting in many knowledge gaps or 

thin evidence. 

237. Data collection represents institutional interests and there is little data relating to the 

customer/public experience. This is compounded by data silos resulting from multiple 

stakeholders. 

Discussion 

238. The recognition that the fire sector attracts limited academic interest is not new but is reemphasised. 

Since the demise of the national facility, there have been many attempts to create a 

research strategy and capability, but none have been realised. This increasingly places the 

effectiveness and credibility of the sector at risk and undermines any aspiration to be 

demonstrably evidence-based. It also leaves the sector unable to meaningfully exploit new and 

transformative technologies such as AI and machine learning. More importantly, it leaves the 

public exposed to avoidable risks and harm through the failure to collate, assess and disseminate 

knowledge. 

239. Institutionally biased and siloed data collection means the public experience is almost invisible to 

policymakers and other professionals. In place of knowledge, assumptions are made. Good 

practice would, as a minimum, see these made explicit as they represent unverified beliefs and 

therefore cannot be relied upon. Better still, the opportunity to collect relevant data through 

routine activities (including dwelling/HMO fires) should be exploited to both inform and 

evaluate interventions. 

240. However, the fire sector is not unique in facing these challenges, and, if the will were 

there, quick progress would be possible by learning from other sectors. Concepts such 

as the ‘What Works’ centres may be replicable in part or at reduced scale. 

44 

2

241. Recognition of the influence of what and how data is collected is not entirely new. In 2003, an 

industry survey identified that the role of extinguishers was not accurately represented and did 

not accurately convey their important contribution. It is clear, 18 years later, that not much has 

changed. 


242. The fire sector urgently needs to co-operate to develop an integrated and dynamic knowledge 

management system. 

243. A specific focus for the above should be to ensure the customer/public experience and perspective 

is fully represented. 

Risk 

Findings 

244. The understanding and application of risk in relation to dwelling/HMO fires is varied, confusing 

and ambiguous both in the literature and in practice. The research finds that there is a need to 

better align risk theory, evidence, practice and communication between professionals and with 

the public. 

Discussion 

245. Throughout the research for this report, references were found to ‘risk’, which was not 

unexpected. However, it was clear that this was most often used in a generic and unqualified 

sense. As the fire sector (including services related to fire extinguishers) is ultimately in the risk 

business, it would be inappropriate to ignore this observation or to consider its impact. 

246. Several studies have identified that even in academic papers, the term risk is used interchangeably 

and without distinction to variously mean the risk of a fire starting, of it developing, causing an 

injury or leading to a fatality. These are all very different risks. 

247. This oversimplification and failure to convey the complex and layered or nuanced nature of risk is 

then seen in sector publications and practice. As a result, there is little appreciation that those 

who incur minor injuries are vastly different to those at risk of a fatal outcome, with each group 

having different needs and capabilities. This is accompanied by a tendency for policies and 

interventions to overly focus on the worst-case outcome. Hence, we see the general public 

discouraged from tackling fires despite the evidence of their effectiveness, low risks presented and 

benefits achieved. 

248. Selectivity about what data is of interest distorts the true picture. In the same way that the police 

recognised the need to capture the full picture and nature of unrecorded crime, the fire sector 

would benefit from having a single and full view of all dwelling/HMO fires. This would better 

inform existing interventions and potentially identify new options/community needs. But 

certainly, the absence of a complete picture means that the level of risk evident from FRS 

data, whilst relatively low, is still significantly more than the real risk encountered if all 

dwelling/HMO fires were included. Risk management cannot be effective if the data or 

knowledge it is based on is incomplete or flawed. The role of bias (individual and 

45 

organisational) and assumptions must also be understood in terms of their influence 

on the interpretation and assessment of risk.

249. The role and influence of case studies may also overly inflate perceived risk, despite the fact that 

they are highlighted because they are atypical. That is not to say they do not provide a valuable 

learning opportunity, but so do most events which avoid bad outcomes. The chance to learn from 

success, when fire spread is limited, and injuries avoided should be of equal interest. 

250. There is much more that could be discussed in relation to risk. But for the purpose of this report, it 

is important to note that the guidance and advice (to professionals and the public) regarding the 

use of fire extinguishers is not informed by a complete and objective evidence base or risk 

framework. As a result, insufficient distinction is made of the risks in relation to different groups, 

and, perversely, it may leave many vulnerable to worse experiences and outcomes than could be 

achieved for them by a more positive and informed approach to the use of extinguishers. 


251. The fire sector needs greater clarity, consistency and transparency in relation to its approach to 

risk management. This should include areas such as definitions, use of evidence, risk models and 

evaluation processes. 

252. Legislation, standards, guidance and public advice should be amended to provide evidence-based 

and objective information in relation to the benefits and risks associated with the use of portable 

fire extinguishers, which are currently misrepresented. 

46 

4

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Variables’, Fire Safety Science, vol. 11, pp. 1049–1062 [Online]. Available at 

http://www.iafss.org/publications/fss/11/1049/view/fss_11-1049.pdf 

Thanks also to Community Safety Statistics /Welsh Government for Welsh FRS data. 

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About the author 

David Wales CCXP MSc FRSA 

David is the founder of SharedAim Ltd., a company established to help organisations deliver excellent 

customer experience and enhance performance. It specialises in using a human first approach that 

recognises the dynamic and complex nature of people’s lives. Uniquely, this allows organisations to take 

an outside-in view and have a realistic understanding of how they fit into their customers world. 

Prior to this, David had a distinguished career in the Fire and Rescue Service, where he instigated and led 

an award-winning national study of human behaviour in fires. His insights provided an entirely new 

perspective and changed thinking and practice in the sector, in the UK and internationally. As a result, he 

was appointed as the first customer experience manager in the FRS, where he was also recognised for his 

innovation. 

In 2019, his co-authored report ‘Saving Lives Is Not Enough’ (https://tinyurl.com/SLINE2019) was 

published, bringing a survivor and evidence-based perspective to challenge current pre-hospital burn care 

arrangements. 

David completed a MSc in risk crisis and disaster management at the University of Leicester. His 

dissertation was titled ‘Unrecognised: The public role as first responders to dwelling fires’. 

He retains an interest in supporting the emergency sector and is an advisor to several international crisis 

and disaster organisations. He has held a variety of voluntary roles, including the international research 

lead for the National Fire Chiefs Council and the evidence champion (for the FRS) with the Alliance for 

Useful Evidence. 

An award-winning presenter, best-selling author, awards judge and recognised customer experience 

influencer, David has worked extensively across multiple sectors. Taking a human-centred approach, David 

advocates the need to re-imagine and transform services in partnership with citizens and communities. 

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Acknowledgement 

The author is grateful for a funding contribution in support of the preparation of this report that was 

received from the Independent Fire Engineering & Distributors Association (IFEDA). The contents of the 

report belong to the author and should not be assumed to reflect IFEDA policy or views. 

Report design by Rory Blacktop-Wales 

Graphic Designer | Photographer 

https://roryblacktop-wales.myportfolio.com/ 

rorybw31@outlook.com 

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This report is available to view or download free of charge. 

Copyright 

The author asserts their full copyright in respect of this publication. © David Wales 2021

An evaluation of the role of fire extinguishers

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