CabinetOffice

The role of Local Resilience Forums:
A reference document

The Civil Contingencies Act (2004), its associated Regulations (2005) and guidance, the National Resilience Capabilities Programme and emergency response and recovery

Civil Contingencies Secretariat

Contents

Introduction

This document is based on current resilience structures and contains guidance that may be subject to change. Please refer to

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-role-of-local-resilience-forums-a-reference-document

1. This document is intended to clarify the role of English and Welsh Local Resilience Forums in relation to:

- the duties within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA);

- the associated Contingency Planning Regulations 2005 (Regulations) and guidance;

- the National Resilience Capabilities Programme (NRCP); and

- Emergency Response and Recovery.

2. A Local Resilience Forum (LRF) is not a legal entity, nor does a Forum have powers to direct its members. Nevertheless, the CCA and the Regulations provide that responders, through the Forum, have a collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-agency environment.

3. This responsibility is best fulfilled where the LRF is organised as a collaborative mechanism for delivery equipped to achieve the mutual aims and outcomes agreed by the member organisations (partners), able to monitor its own progress and strengths, and active in identifying and developing necessary improvements.

4. A total of 42 LRFs have been established and serve communities defined by the boundaries of Police Areas across England and Wales.[1] Many Forums periodically consider the need for a systematic review to improve the way in which their Forum operates.

---

[1] Different arrangements apply in London – see Chapter 9 of *Emergency Preparedness*

Purpose of this document

5.   This document sets out the role of LRFs. It highlights some of the key aspects that demonstrate robust compliance with the duties under the CCA and Regulations and suggests issues, processes, systems and activities that responders will need to consider when establishing effective mechanisms to deliver work through the LRF. The document also identifies broad criteria that the LRF partnership can use as indicators of good practice.

6.   By establishing this reference framework of expectations and outcomes, the principal aim of this document is to encourage and support LRFs in learning and continuous development, taking forward their capabilities in civil contingencies, emergency preparedness and elements of response and recovery. It is for use individually and collectively by organisations that constitute an LRF or contribute to its work. Assurance agencies may also use this document in guiding their assessments of engagement among local agencies in their collective LRF responsibilities and in supporting the agencies' efforts to manage and develop their individual and collective effectiveness.

7.   This document does not seek to identify particular local methods as recommended wider practice. Instead, as part of a programme focusing on CCA implementation, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) will continue to collect best practice which will be available to responders on the National Resilience Extranet (NRE).

8.   The information given in this document is not designed to encompass the whole statutory regime. Rather, it is intended to provide a consistent framework for self-assessment and peer review.

9.   The information in this document should be read in conjunction with *Emergency Preparedness – Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004*, to which responders must have regard, and which sets out the generic framework for civil protection.;

10.   In addition, the list below is a series of other guidance documents that provide a context for the framework of expectations and outcomes:

- *Responding to Emergencies: The UK Central Government Response – Concept of Operations;* and

- *Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders*;

11. Different arrangements apply in Northern Ireland and Scotland:

- *The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework* sets out civil contingencies arrangements in Northern Ireland.

- In Scotland, *Preparing Scotland: Scottish Guidance on Resilience* sets out practical, generic guidance on preparation and response.

How to use this document

12. This document is structured in three parts as follows:

- **Part 1** relates to the CCA and its associated Regulations and guidance.

- **Part 2** focuses on the National Resilience Capabilities Programme.

- **Part 3** provides a checklist for response and recovery, including requirements for resilient telecommunications. (This section also highlights the link between (a) statutory preparation and (b) response and recovery.)

13. The advice and guidance in each of these sections has been produced by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and lead government departments. It is recommended that the advice and guidance is used by LRFs to support the production of a checklist of issues and outcomes that will enable self-assessment, peer review and improvement.

14. Throughout this document we use the term '**emergency**': By emergency we mean:

- **an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare**. Under the CCA, 'an event or situation threatens damage to human welfare only if it involves, causes or may cause loss of human life; human illness or injury; homelessness; damage to property; disruption of the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of a system of communication; disruption of facilities for transport; or disruption of services relating to health';

- **an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment**. Under the CCA, 'an event or situation threatens damage to the environment only if it involves, causes or may cause contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radio-active matter; or disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life'; and

- **war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK**.

15. A full glossary of the terms and acronyms used in this document can be found in the Civil Contingencies Lexicon. This is of wider significance in that commonly-understood terminology is fundamental to the ability of emergency responders to work together effectively, build a shared understanding of risks, capabilities, vulnerabilities and interdependencies and have a common appreciation of events and their implications during emergency response and recovery. For this reason responder organisations are strongly encouraged to ensure that their locally used

terminology is consistent with that set out in the lexicon as the authoritative point of reference.

Devolved administrations

16. LRFs should be aware of the different structures and approaches that may be used within the devolved administrations[2] so that they can collaborate during the response and recovery phases of cross-border emergencies and seek or provide mutual aid where this may be required. This is particularly relevant to those LRFs that share borders with any of the devolved administrations.

Scotland

17. For Scotland, the document *Preparing Scotland: Scottish Guidance on Preparing for Emergencies* sets out practical, generic guidance on preparation and response, including the principles of Integrated Emergency Management which are used to underpin the detailed response structures and arrangements at each of the resilience tiers.

18. The Resilience Advisory Board for Scotland (RABS) provides strategic policy advice to Scottish ministers and others on emergency preparedness and response, and the Scottish Capabilities Programme contributes to the development of resilience across Scotland.

19. At a local level in Scotland, a number of constabulary area-based Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (equivalent to a Local Resilience Forum in England and Wales) determine local responder arrangements for planning, response and recovery. Further information about Scottish resilience may be found at www.scotland.gov.uk/topics/justice/public-safety/ready-scotland.

Wales

20. In Wales, the Wales Resilience Forum promotes good communication and enhances emergency planning across agencies and services in Wales by providing a forum for chief officers to discuss strategic issues of emergency preparedness with Welsh ministers. Wales has four LRFs: Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales and South Wales. The LRFs are supported by co-ordinating groups, sub-groups or task and finish groups that have been established to develop various capabilities or set specific targets in strengthening local resilience through multi-agency collaboration. The Pan-Wales Response Plan provides a framework for the management of a

---

[2] See also Chapters 10, 11 and 12 of *Emergency Preparedness*

major emergency affecting several or all areas of Wales.

21. The strategic framework for capability development in Wales is set out in the Wales Resilience Forum business plan, which is produced on an annual basis. The primary objective of the business plan is to identify clearly the relationship between planning for emergencies at the local, Wales and UK levels and to co-ordinate this work. The business plan ensures that co-ordination work at the pan-Wales level adds value to work being undertaken at other levels. At the core of the plan is a Wales Resilience Partnership Team, established to co-ordinate civil protection work in Wales.

22. Further information about resilience may be found at http://wales.gov.uk/resilience/home.

Northern Ireland

23. In Northern Ireland, statutory duties under Part 1 of the CCA apply only to a limited number of organisations. As a consequence, the requirements in the Regulations in relation to LRFs do not apply in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework sets out the guiding principles that underpin resilience in Northern Ireland and the expectations on public service organisations.

24. Because of the small size of Northern Ireland and the centralisation of many services, much multi-agency planning is carried out at regional level. Multi-agency civil contingencies activities are also carried out at sub-regional and local levels through a variety of co-ordination arrangements.

25. Further information is available in *A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland* and on the Civil Contingencies Policy Branch website at www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/emergencies.

26. Individual organisations in Northern Ireland, particularly the emergency services, have mutual aid arrangements with English, Welsh and Scottish organisations that would be invoked in the event of a major incident involving either party. Co-ordination and information sharing between Northern Ireland and English, Welsh and Scottish organisations during a UK-wide emergency such as an influenza pandemic would normally take place at government department level.

Part 1: The CCA and its associated Regulations and guidance

Introduction

27. This section focuses on the CCA and its associated Regulations and guidance. It builds on the information in [Emergency Preparedness](#) and the *[Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders](#)*.

28. The advice within this section is broken down into subsections, grouped under general arrangements for LRFs and the collective delivery of the different statutory duties. There is also a short section on locally led assurance and improvement.

29. Information is presented in table format. Where necessary for clarity, guidance and regulation have been summarised but references to source documents are provided in footnotes.

30. The tables are each set out in three sections:

- Those requirements emanating from legislation are highlighted in red. These sections outline any mandatory requirements (i.e. where the LRF '**must**' do something) and signpost relevant legal requirements under the CCA and Regulations.

- The yellow sections outline recommended elements of the CCA regime (i.e. where guidance suggests that the LRF '**should**' do something rather than 'must').

- The green sections in the tables outline **good practice indicators**. These sections describe expected outcomes in order to provide a picture of what compliance with statutory obligations based on recommended good practice might look like.

Locally led assurance and improvement

31. Duties under the CCA rest with responders but can be exercised through the LRF. For example, the duty to prepare a Community Risk Register under Regulation 15 rests with Category 1 responders but must be delivered collectively as part of the LRF. Co-operation and collaboration in discharging these duties are central to the function of an LRF.

32. It is therefore important that the LRF monitors success in achieving meaningful collaboration, identifying exceptions and, where necessary, taking action to resolve the issue. While co-operation is the expected and usual default – with timely, local action to resolve difficulties – on occasion an individual responder, community group or other resilience partner is better placed to resolve the issue. On other occasions, more protracted issues can arise and ultimately an LRF is able to escalate issues to a higher tier.

33. Responders will be aware that Sections 9 and 10[3] of the CCA make provision for monitoring, together with enforcement action if non-compliance is evident.

LRFs – general arrangements

34. Box 2 sets out the purpose of an LRF. A fuller description is available in [Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2: Co-operation.](#)

Box 2: Purpose of the LRF

'The purpose of the LRF process is to ensure effective delivery of those duties under the Act that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment and individually as a Category 1 responder. In particular the LRF process should deliver:

- the compilation of agreed risk profiles for the area, through a Community Risk Register;

- a systematic, planned and co-ordinated approach to encourage Category 1 responders, according to their functions, to address all aspects of policy in relation to:

  - risk;

  - planning for emergencies;

  - planning for business continuity management;

  - publishing information about risk assessments and plans;

  - arrangements to warn and inform the public; and

  - other aspects of civil protection duty, including the promotion of business continuity management by local authorities; and

- support for the preparation by all or some of its members of multi-agency plans and other documents, including protocols and agreements and the co-ordination of multi-agency exercises and other training events.'

35. In order to fulfil these objectives, the LRF needs to operate effectively as a collective body, managing a programme of work and exercising leadership to establish, test and review necessary plans and strategies.

36. In achieving this purpose, the structures and approaches used may vary but certain key elements are required, and each LRF will seek similar outcomes in leadership and delivery as well as the systems it operates to manage and evaluate performance.

37. Some aspects affecting the conduct of an LRF are directly mandated (for example the minimum frequency of meetings), but flexibility is available in other matters to suit local decisions or arrangements.

38. The following identifies LRF members' mandatory requirements and also highlights other issues that need to be considered as well as indicators of good practice. This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2: Co-operation

LRF Mandatory requirements
Category 1 responders must co-operate with each other in connection with the performance of their duties under the CCA. The LRF, based on each Police Area (with the exception of London, where one area covers both Metropolitan and City Police Areas), shall be the principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation.[4]
The LRF must meet at least once every six months[5] and each Category 1 responder must, so far as reasonably practicable, attend such a meeting or be effectively represented at that meeting.[6]
Category 1 responders must consider whether a Category 2 responder should be invited to attend meetings. They must also make arrangements for a Category 2 responder to attend where the Category 2 responder wishes to do so.[7]
So far as reasonably practicable a Category 2 responder must attend a meeting of the LRF, or be effectively represented at that meeting, if it is invited to do so by all Category 1 responders.[8]
Category 1 responders must keep Category 2 responders informed of the matters which are likely to be discussed at LRF meetings and must advise them when and where LRF meetings are to take place.[9]

---

[4] Regulations 3, 4(2)(b) and 4(3)
[5] Regulation 4(4)
[6] Regulation 4(4)
[7] Regulation 7
[8] Regulation 6(a)
[9] Regulation 7

The Category 1 responder with lead responsibility for a particular duty must ensure that other responders are kept informed of how the lead responder is performing the duty and must co-operate with non-lead responders. (In particular, the lead responder must ensure that non-lead responders approve of the way in which the lead responder is performing the duty[10] and achieving mutual aims and objectives.)

Category 2 responders must co-operate with Category 1 responders in connection with the performance by that Category 1 responder of its duties under Section 2(1).[11]

Through the LRF, Category 1 responders must collectively:

- exercise plans; and
- learn and implement lessons from exercises, emergencies and emerging policy.[12]

Issues for the LRF to consider

The UK approach to resilience is based on the principle of subsidiarity, where decisions and responsibilities should rest at the lowest appropriate level, with collaboration and co-ordination at the highest level necessary. LRFs should therefore consider whether another tier or business partner is best placed to address a specific issue. Other tiers and partners might include:

- individual residents;
- community groups;
- responders and other partners; or
- central government.

LRFs should also consider whether collaboration between LRFs can achieve a more effective and efficient solution (including managing financial burdens on responders), using mechanisms such as:

- lead responders;
- direct working between partners from individual sectors;
- multi-agency working; and
- pooling and aligning budgets and resources.

The choice of LRF chair is based on the principle that the chair should be a person able to speak with authority about the LRF area and civil protection issues. They should also be able to commit sufficient time to prepare fully for Forum meetings.

The LRF chair should also be the lead point of contact for information disseminated from other tiers, resilience partners and partnerships.

The LRF itself is a strategic group and should attract a sufficiently senior level of representation. The local authority representative, for example, should be the chief executive or deputy chief executive and the police representative should be the area chief constable or deputy chief constable.

The LRF should ensure that participants at its routine meetings reflect the membership of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) which would be called in in response to any emergency in the LRF area.[13]

The LRF works alongside other elements of the multi-agency planning framework, particularly the resilience planning framework. However, the resilience framework is not a hierarchy and, under the principle of subsidiarity, direction, information and support should flow in both directions.

The LRF should establish and monitor an appropriate range of sub-groups as well as task and

---

[10] Regulation 10
[11] Regulation 4(5)
[12] Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2: Co-operation , *UK Central Government Response – Concept of Operations*
[13] R*The UK Central Government Response – Concept of Operations,*

finish groups, that are competent in the delivery of allocated workstreams.

Each sub-group should have a clear purpose connected to the strategic priorities set by the LRF.

The LRF should encourage individual organisations to meet their responsibilities under the CCA. In addition, it should monitor the response to any informal or formal contact with an organisation and have mechanisms in place to formally raise concerns if these are not resolved through informal contact and encouragement.

The LRF should have procedures in place to escalate concerns if they are severe or not resolved as a result of formally raising concerns; and to de-escalate issues as and when they are resolved.

Effective performance by the LRF requires secretariat support to fulfil key tasks.

The choice of personnel for the secretariat is a matter for local determination but those taking up the task should:

- be able to take on the job on a permanent basis;
- be of a level of seniority or competence to be able to support the chair in managing the business of strategic-level forum meetings;
- consider the impact of other legislation, such as the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001, on its work programme;
- have the back-up of an administration team which can, as necessary, produce and circulate documents quickly; and
- be competent in organising or supporting officers from their own or other organisations in administering the work of sub-groups.

In order to prevent undue pressure on a small number of individual members' resources, the LRF should consider the need to fund a central secretariat through, for example, a subscription scheme or levy.[14] The LRF should manage its financial operations effectively and could consider sharing information with other LRFs about costs associated with secretariat functions as best practice.

The LRF should be well organised so that it can achieve its aims, and meetings should be thoroughly prepared so that senior officers' time is used well.

LRF meetings should have a clear agenda, and papers should be circulated sufficiently in advance to allow clear discussion. A clear record of meetings should be kept and minutes circulated promptly.

Regardless of the way in which organisations are represented on the LRF, all papers should be copied to all Category 1 and 2 responders in the LRF area (and to any other standing members who are not Category 1 or 2 responders).

LRF processes should also:

- share lessons learned from emergencies and exercises in other parts of the UK and overseas;
- make sure that those lessons are acted on to improve local arrangements;
- consider civil protection policy initiatives from other tiers; and
- ensure a place within the formal civil protection framework for organisations which are not Category 1 or 2 responders (for example voluntary organisations; community groups or those tasked with ensuring compliance with the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 and the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996).

Indicators of good practice in the LRF

---

[14] Department for Communities and Local Government (2010) *Guidance to Local Areas in England on Pooling and Aligning Budgets*,

The LRF has Terms of Reference and is systematic in managing its business through a programme of workstreams, projects and allocated actions.
The LRF's secretariat services are appropriately resourced and provide effective support in: • fixing dates of meetings; • agreeing agenda items and attendance with members; • organising the production of discussion papers and presentations; • briefing the chair; • taking minutes; • following up matters arising and action points; • disseminating papers; • ensuring that sub-group meetings are effectively scheduled and organised and that minutes are recorded; and • ensuring that relevant matters arising from sub-group meetings are brought to the attention of the LRF.
The LRF has methods in place to monitor the work being undertaken by sub-groups and receives regular progress reports.
The LRF is capable of identifying exceptions and challenges others to ensure timeliness and quality of planning and other work is undertaken.
At strategic and sub-group levels, the LRF uses recognised methods within a performance framework to continuously develop performance and ensure quality, and to achieve and maintain the highest standards.
Where possible, the LRF seeks to deliver responsibilities under the CCA and other legislation concurrently, in order to reduce burdens on partners.
The LRF actively makes and maintains links with other partners and multi-agency bodies.
The LRF promotes independent evaluation of tests or exercises used to validate plans or procedures.
The LRF actively promulgates and promotes examples of best practice internally and externally.
The LRF makes effective use of the National Resilience Extranet in sharing information with member organisations and other resilience forums, as well as with resilience partners at other tiers within the resilience community.

Peer review and validation (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 13: Support and challenge)

39. The plans produced individually by responders and collectively by LRFs to develop emergency response capabilities or to promulgate resilience information require testing to check and improve their effectiveness. LRF functions will also need periodic examination to check the efficiency of processes and methods and to identify potential areas for improvement. Currently the Government relies on good practice in performance management and on established

assurance agencies across Category 1 and 2 organisations to assess performance.[15]

40.   Where key response plans are being developed, a series of different approaches to inspect, test, exercise and review will be necessary before the plan is validated. Thereafter, these processes will need to be embedded in a continuous improvement process to ensure that plans remain fit for purpose. Similarly, the LRF will need to engage in deliberate evaluation through meaningful review of functions, procedures and performance in meeting its responsibilities or delivering against its own programme of work and performance outcomes.

41.   In commissioning these processes, it may be necessary to involve external or specialist knowledge and experience. In most cases, it will be desirable that independent elements are used to extend and ensure the scope and depth of evaluation – for example in the design and evaluation of exercises or by the inclusion of elected members, internal/external resilience partners, senior officers, customers or key partners in review processes.

42.   Each LRF is therefore encouraged to examine its strategic approach to reviews and validation to ensure that, across its members, there is a collective agreement to support effective processes for testing and improvement. This may need to include agreements to identify individuals with appropriate skills and experience who can be made available to conduct necessary reviews for the LRF. It may also include agreements with local responders, or could be achieved through collaboration with another LRF.

Examples of good practice

43.   There are examples of good practice working arrangements and initiatives within many LRFs and these are shared as appropriate. Some current examples linked to Emergency Preparedness (EP) chapters 2-7 (Co-operation, Information Sharing, Local Responder Risk Assessment, Emergency Planning, Business Continuity Management and Communicating with the Public) are available in the document store on the National Resilience Extranet (NRE) at GSE: https://www.resilience-extranet.gse.gov.uk/casestudies or internet: https://www.resilience-extranet.gov.uk/casestudies

---

[15] *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraph 13.8 et seq

Duties under the CCA

Duty to assess risk (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 4: Local responder risk assessment duty)

44. The duties to assess risks and to prepare and maintain the Community Risk Register for a local resilience area rest with Category 1 responders. However, responders in England and Wales must deliver these duties as part of the LRF.[16]

45. The LRF must therefore support Category 1 responders to fulfil their duties as a collective duty and it follows that the LRF must have appropriate and effective leadership, structures and business processes in place in order to achieve this collective duty.

46. The purposes of this collective duty are to:

- ensure that Category 1 responders have an accurate, shared understanding of the risks that they face so that planning is proportionate and soundly based;
- provide a rational basis for the prioritisation of objectives, work programmes and the allocation of resources;
- enable Category 1 responders to assess the adequacy of their plans and capabilities;
- facilitate joined-up local planning, based on consistent planning assumptions;
- enable Category 1 responders to provide an accessible overview of the context for emergency and business continuity planning for the public and officials; and
- inform and reflect other tiers' risk assessments in order to support emergency planning and capability development within those tiers.

47. The assessment of the risk of an emergency occurring within or affecting a geographical area for which each Category 1 responder is responsible must also take account of whether:

- the threat may be of a scale and nature that it is likely to seriously obstruct a Category 1 responder in the performance of its functions; and

---

[16] Regulation 15

- the threat or hazard requires the Category 1 responder to exercise its functions and undertake a special mobilisation.[17]

Risk assessment mandatory requirements

Category 1 responders must regularly assess the risk of an emergency occurring. [18]

Category 1 responders are required to consider whether plans should be modified in the light of risk assessments.[19]

Category 1 responders must co-operate with each other (collectively through the LRF[20]) to prepare and maintain the Community Risk Register.[21]

Category 1 responders must ensure (collectively through the LRF) that the risk assessment is updated regularly and is proportionate to the risks identified in the LRF area. [22]

Risk assessment issues to consider

The LRF should confirm collectively that organisations in its area are assessing risk in accordance with the CCA and should have a process in place to identify those organisations that are not doing so.

The LRF should formally endorse the Community Risk Register and should consider identifying one or more Category 1 responder organisations to take lead responsibility for assessing certain risks.[23]

Category 1 responders should use the Local Risk Assessment Guidance and local intelligence to assess whether there are any particular risks which, because of special factors or other relevance, should be communicated specifically to neighbouring LRFs.[24]

In performing the duty to arrange for the publication of assessments and plans, the LRF must collectively understand the needs and capacities for information sharing and have regard to the importance of not alarming the public unnecessarily.[25]

Where Category 1 responders have access to specialist assessments such as counter-terrorism security advice and critical national infrastructure advice, the LRF should ensure that it has mechanisms in place to ensure effective, appropriate and (if necessary) speedy communication of the assessments among LRF members.[26]

Indicators of risk assessment good practice

---

[57] CCA, Section 1(4)(a) and (b)
[18] CCA, Section 2(1)(a) and (b)
[19] CCA, Section 2(1)(e)
[20] Regulation 8
[21] Regulation 15
[22] CCA, Section 2(1)(a) and (b)
[23] Regulations 9–11
[24] Regulation 18
[25] Regulation 27
[26] CCA, Section 21(a) and (b); Regulations 9–11 and Regulation 18;

The LRF collectively identifies organisations where risk assessment processes can be developed, offers organisations support to improve performance directly or by brokering support from another source, identifies strengths to build on and weaknesses to remedy, and monitors the impact of the support given to organisations.[27]
The LRF has established a risk assessment working group (which can include Category 2 responders) under a chair appointed by the LRF so that the Community Risk Register is collectively owned by Category 1 responders in the LRF.[28]
The LRF collectively ensures that the Community Risk Register is used to inform local planning, including in London, where there are Borough Resilience Forums in place.
The LRF engages effectively with the other resilience tiers and neighbouring LRFs to share and compare risk assessments.
The LRF has established effective and appropriate processes for communication of information from specialist risk or threat assessments.
The LRF ensures that risk assessment methods used in compiling and reviewing the Community Risk Register comply with the recommended processes set out in *Emergency Preparedness*.[29]
The LRF operates efficient procedures to monitor emergent risks or changes affecting the Community Risk Register and to initiate new assessments where necessary.
The LRF has established an effective process to regularly review and update its Community Risk Register assessments.
The LRF has established effective links for sharing risk assessments with other local partnerships in its area in order to achieve consistency and to avoid duplication or counter-productive work.
The LRF uses a range of information sources to monitor public concerns and preferences, and the effects of its own communication.

Duty to maintain plans – emergency plans (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 5: Emergency planning)

48.   The duty to prepare general emergency plans rests with Category 1 responders. The main requirement of the CCA is that plans are maintained to ensure that, if an emergency occurs (or is likely to occur), each Category 1 responder can deliver its functions so far as necessary for the purpose of:

- preventing the emergency;

- reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects; or

---

[27] *Developing Performance in the Civil Contingencies Community* (under development)
[28] Source: *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraph 4.33
[29] Source: *Emergency Preparedness*, Chapter 4 and Annexe 4, sections a–f

- taking other action as appropriate. [30]

49. Duties to plan for incidents that fall within the ambit of The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, The Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996, and The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 are covered by these regulations. [31]

50. The CCA does not impose a duty on Category 1 responders to prevent **all** emergencies but does require planning for preventive steps that might contribute to the avoidance of a predictable emergency where prompt, decisive action is taken. In particular, plans are required to ensure that the organisation can perform its functions in order to prevent the emergency.[32]

51. Responders also have a duty to consider collaborating with other responders to develop and maintain multi-agency plans.[33] LRFs are the principal conduit for responders to collaborate and co-operate with each other. They should guide, facilitate and co-ordinate the process.

52. While the responsibility for formulating plans rests individually with Category 1 responders, the CCA and Regulations anticipate that 'lead responsibility' arrangements will be made to avoid duplication of similar plans across several agencies and to avoid counter-productive plans. The LRF has a significant role in brokering or co-ordinating such arrangements and in facilitating joint testing, exercising and communication.

53. Regular meetings, exercises and other events prompted by LRF business provide important opportunities for interaction between key leaders, managers and staff among all the organisations represented on the LRF. This environment should aid development of the shared understanding and co-operative working methods envisaged by the CCA and set out as guiding principles in the central government Concept of Operations that will take effect at the time of an emergency.

54. In addition to its role in co-ordinating Community Risk Register plans or emergency plans relating to other legislation, the LRF is required to establish and test its collective arrangements to form a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) at the time of an emergency. The purpose of an SCG is to liaise with other tiers of government during an emergency and to lead the response

---

[30] CCA, Section 2(1)(d)
[31] Regulation 12
[32] CCA, Section 2(1)(d)(1)
[33] Regulation 22

and recovery activities, with the aims of:

- saving and protecting human life;

- relieving suffering;

- protecting property;

- providing the public with information;

- containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread;

- maintaining critical services;

- maintaining normal services at an appropriate level;

- protecting the health and safety of personnel;

- safeguarding the environment;

- facilitating investigations and enquiries;

- promoting self-help and recovery;

- restoring normality as soon as possible; and

- evaluating the response and identifying lessons learned.

55.   In order to fulfil the requirements for operating an effective SCG, facilities, systems, staffing arrangements and familiar co-operative procedures that enable interoperability[34] between the various organisations will need to be in place. Prior to an emergency, the LRF performs a crucial role in driving arrangements to plan, validate and meet these needs.

56.   These matters are explored further in Part 3. More information concerning requirements and the links between different government tiers may be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations.

---

[34] Interoperability is defined as 'the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of course'. While the term is not referred to in the CCA, it relates fundamentally to cooperation in emergency preparedness, response and recovery and a programme has been established to enhance interoperability between the emergency services and address persistent shortcomings in the multi-agency response to emergencies. The Emergency Services should note the work of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) (*www.jesip.org.uk)* and products to enhance interoperability will be issued during 2013-14.

Emergency planning mandatory requirements

Category 1 responders (collectively through the LRF) must consider whether a risk assessment makes it necessary or expedient to add to or modify emergency plans and must enable responders to be aware of each other's plans.

Category 1 responders (collectively through the LRF) must maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that, if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur, responders are able to continue to perform necessary functions for the purpose of:

- preventing the emergency;
- reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects; or
- taking other action in connection with it.[35]

The LRF must be a forum for local issues, including providing information and feedback to and from the other resilience tiers, and must facilitate the agreement of the role and identity of responders who will lead the preparation of emergency plans.

The LRF must collectively exercise plans and must learn and implement lessons from exercises, emergencies and emerging policy.

The LRF must collaborate with neighbouring LRFs in producing and exercising a generic emergency response plan in order to ensure that, together, they are prepared to respond to larger-scale emergencies.

Emergency planning issues to consider

The LRF should collectively identify organisations in its area that are not developing and maintaining emergency plans in accordance with the CCA and should escalate/delegate issues as they arise using the appropriate route.

The LRF should encourage organisations to meet their responsibilities under the CCA and should raise its concerns more formally with organisations if they are not resolved through informal contact and encouragement, monitoring the response and any resulting action.

The LRF should collectively:

- help steer and guide responders through the development of policies and plans;
- enable responders to be aware of issues outside their responsibilities and specialism;
- enable responders to meet their responsibilities in a coherent, consistent and complementary manner through, where necessary, the development of protocols; and

plan for the formation of an SCG to co-ordinate the response to an emergency.

The LRF should escalate issues if they are severe or not resolved as a result of formal contact.

The LRF should also delegate issues as and when they are resolved or if minor action is all that is outstanding.

The LRF should act collectively as the principal mechanism for local multi-agency collaboration in developing and independently testing and exercising plans.

The LRF should be a forum to prepare collectively those individuals and organisations that might have to respond to emergencies by developing clarity of roles and responsibilities.

The LRF should identify organisations that are not actively engaging with the Forum and its work and encourage them to do so by giving direct support or brokering support from another source to ensure that organisations get the support they need to develop plans.

The LRF should have processes in place to monitor the impact of the support given to

---

[35] CCA, Section 2(1)(d) and (e)

organisations.

The LRF should ensure collectively that emergency plans affecting its area include appropriate consideration of:

- the effects of the emergency and whether these can be prevented, reduced, controlled or mitigated, as well as the necessary actions required;

- secondary effects and other necessary arrangements (e.g. resilient internal communications);

- the extent to which the emergency will place demands on resources and capacity; and

the potential relevance of the activities of any voluntary organisations operating in the LRF.

The LRF should ensure collectively that emergency plans affecting its area include appropriate consideration of:

- the effects of the emergency and whether these can be prevented, reduced, controlled or mitigated, as well as the necessary actions required;

- secondary effects and other necessary arrangements (e.g. resilient internal communications);

- the extent to which the emergency will place demands on resources and capacity; and

the potential relevance of the activities of any voluntary organisations operating in the LRF.

The LRF should undertake collective scrutiny to validate emergency plans, where possible using independent and peer review processes, to ensure quality and compliance with statutory guidance and advice published by agencies such as the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Chief Fire Officers Association and the Local Government Association.

Emergency planning indicators of good practice

The LRF undertakes a regular collective process to identify where risk assessment makes it necessary or expedient to add to or modify emergency plans and has established systematic methods for review and modification.

The LRF has satisfactorily identified the range of emergency plans it requires for the purpose of ensuring that, if an emergency occurs, responders are able to continue to perform their necessary functions. Through its members and sub-groups, the LRF has an appropriate programme of development in place to deliver and maintain the necessary plans.

The LRF has suitable protocols that identify appropriate lead agencies and which support coherent and collective practice in developing its emergency plans.

The LRF has established a systematic programme to prioritise, test, exercise and validate its plans and procedures, involving, where appropriate, independent or external peer reviews.

The LRF is able collectively to identify organisations that are not developing and maintaining emergency plans and has effective protocols and procedures in place either to provide and broker support or to escalate concerns where necessary.

The LRF has plans in place that identify who would chair an SCG and any necessary Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) to deal with an emergency.

The LRF has developed mechanisms to ensure that emergency plans are communicated and shared appropriately between responders and resilience partners as well as the other resilience tiers.

The LRF has agreed procedures collectively to ensure the security of sensitive information in the sharing and communication of emergency plans, as well as procedures to ensure that responders have access to sensitive information where it is needed for resilience purposes, and has procedures to ensure that responders are not overwhelmed with unnecessary information.

The LRF uses effective methods to enable responders to be aware of issues outside their responsibilities and specialist areas and to steer and guide responders through the development of policies and plans.

The LRF has developed a specific plan to establish an SCG in response to an emergency and has collectively tested and validated the readiness and effectiveness of people, policies, systems, procedures, resources, facilities and equipment that will be deployed.

The LRF ensures collectively that the methods used for producing its emergency plans comply with the recommended processes set out in *Emergency Preparedness* and other national guidance. The LRF:

- uses individual plans to inform or integrate with the LRF plans;
- seeks external readiness assessments of multi-agency plans;
- seeks peer review of multi-agency plans;
- seeks testing and exercising of multi-agency plans;
- uses information from regulatory bodies to assess readiness;
- promotes exercises and training that encompass all LRF members; and
- appropriately escalates/delegates issues to the other resilience tiers.

Duty to maintain plans – business continuity (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 6: Business continuity management)

57.   Category 1 responders have a duty to develop and maintain business continuity plans to ensure that they can continue to function in the event of an emergency. LRFs must be aware of responders' plans and must support business continuity management (BCM) activities.

58.   Local authorities have a separate duty to provide generic BCM advice and assistance to the wider business community and the voluntary sector (see 'Duty to promote business ' below). The key objectives under this duty are to minimise the economic impact of emergencies on the local community and to link organisations with the planning developed by Category 1 responders.

Business continuity management mandatory requirements
Category 1 responders must maintain plans to ensure that, if an emergency occurs, their organisation is able to continue to perform its functions. They must also consider whether a risk assessment makes it necessary or expedient to add to or modify their business continuity plans.[36]
Business continuity plans must have regard to both internal and external risks and, in an emergency, must enable responders to ensure that they can continue to exercise both civil protection and ordinary functions as far as is practicable.
Responders within the LRF must be aware of BCM issues and must support the promotion of BCM.
Category 1 responders must have clear procedures for implementing a business continuity plan.[37]
Business continuity management issues to consider
The LRF should collectively identify Category 1 responders in their area that are not developing

---

[36] CCA, Section 2(1)(c) and (e)
[37] Regulation 19

and maintaining business continuity plans in accordance with the CCA and should escalate/ de-escalate issues ensuring they are addressed at the most appropriate level and in a timely and proportionate manner.

The LRF should be aware of the steps taken to develop BCM in their area and, where necessary, should support arrangements to provide, broker or signpost BCM advice and assistance to ensure that CCA duties are being fulfilled.[38]

The LRF should support collaborative arrangements designed to fulfil the BCM duty between Category 1 responders.[39]

The LRF should provide means to enable awareness of business continuity plans between Category 1 responders, including arrangements to dovetail plans or agree mutual assistance.

The LRF should support Category 1 responders in testing and exercising business continuity plans, and should ensure that good practice and lessons learned are promulgated. [40]

Business continuity management indicators of good practice

The LRF is able collectively to identify Category 1 responder organisations that are not developing and maintaining business continuity plans, and has effective protocols and procedures in place either to provide and broker support or to escalate concerns where necessary.

The LRF collaborates with other multi-agency partnerships (such as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships) in developing BCM.

The LRF members share business continuity plans and information, supporting the promotion of BCM advice and assistance to the wider business and voluntary community.

The LRF facilitates interactive BCM planning processes between members, and has established protocols for the implementation and mutual aid of business continuity plans in case of an emergency.

The LRF undertakes collective scrutiny to validate BCM planning processes among its members, where possible using independent and peer review processes to ensure quality and compliance with statutory guidance and advice.

The LRF promotes BCM to all levels of responders – including suppliers – and not just those at a strategic level.

The LRF encourages members to ensure that all units and departments have business continuity plans.

Duty to communicate with the public (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 7: Communicating with the public)

59.   The CCA sets out two separate duties: to provide advice and information to the public and to warn them about emergencies. First, responders must make the public aware of the risks of

---

[38] Regulations 41(3) and 41(4); *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraphs 8.12 and 8.38
[39] Regulation 8; *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraph 6.36
[40] Regulation 25; *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraphs 6.96 and 6.10–6.18

emergencies and the planned response. Second, responders must provide information and advice as necessary at the time of the emergency. These duties are based on the premise that a well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency and able to help to minimise the impact of an emergency.[41]

60. Both duties rest with Category 1 responders, and they must collaborate with one another when performing these duties. The LRF is the principal conduit for responders to collaborate and co-operate with one another, and should facilitate the process.[42]

61. In performing these duties, responders must also have regard to the need to avoid unnecessary public alarm. However, research shows that the public have an appetite for information and are more likely to be alarmed if they feel that they have insufficient information. There are ways of informing the public without compromising sensitive information.[43]

Communicating with the public mandatory requirements
Category 1 responders must maintain arrangements to warn the public, and to provide information and advice to the public, if an emergency is likely or has occurred. They must also arrange for the publication of risk assessments and plans in so far as publication is necessary or desirable for the purpose of: • preventing an emergency; • reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects; or • enabling other action to be taken in connection with an emergency.[44]
Responders within the LRF must facilitate the agreement of measures to educate, warn and inform the public.[45]
In arranging for the publication of assessments and plans, there is a collective duty to have regard to the importance of: • not unnecessarily alarming the public; and [46] • safeguarding sensitive information that is relevant to the Prepare and Protect strands of CONTEST.[47]
Responders within the LRF must collectively support neighbouring LRFs in producing a generic, multi-area emergency response plan that includes a framework for awareness raising.
Communicating with the public issues to consider
The LRF should collectively identify Category 1 responders' assessments and plans that may

---

[41] CCA, Section 2(1)(f) and (g)
[42] Regulation 33
[43] More information on these security considerations is available from the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) at http://www.cpni.gov.uk/advice
[44] CCA, Section 2(1)(f) and (g)
[45] CCA, Section 2(1)(f) and (g)
[46] Regulation 27
[47] Part 8 of the Regulations; CPNI guidance on the disclosure into the public domain of sensitive information

require part or full publication in accordance with the CCA.
The LRF should collectively support the design of procedures to warn and inform the public in its area, where necessary identifying strengths and brokering support.
The LRF should collectively examine the nomination of a lead agency among Category 1 responders and develop protocols for collaborative arrangements at the time of an emergency.[48]
The LRF should support efforts to ensure that local warning and informing procedures have regard to similar plans held by Category 2 responders, government agencies or other bodies, and that unnecessary duplication is avoided.
The LRF should undertake collective scrutiny to validate warning and informing plans, where possible using independent and peer review processes to ensure quality and compliance with statutory guidance and advice.
Where risk assessments or plans contain sensitive information, only summary or edited versions should be published.[49]
The LRF should consider collectively what communication systems and procedures would be used by Category 1 responders to communicate with one another during an emergency. The National Resilience Extranet is the recommended principal mechanism for this communication.
The LRF should operate a programme to test and exercise warning and informing procedures, involving, where appropriate, independent or external peer review.
The LRF should use formats and systems that make information accessible, usable and useful to the public.
The LRF should ensure collectively that national security guidance principles are carefully considered before information relating to the detail of risk assessments or emergency plans is published.[50]

Communicating with the public good practice indicators

The LRF has collective strategies or protocols identifying lead responder roles and appropriate methods used to inform the public in the area at the time of an emergency about assessed risks and planned responses.
The LRF collaborates with other multi-agency partnerships (such as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships) in promoting public information.
The LRF engages partner organisations, including the Voluntary Sector and local community organisations / groups, and other tiers in its public information strategies.
Local partners among media organisations have been engaged and are committed to the LRF media plans for sharing information.
LRF member organisations have developed a shared understanding of, and commitment to, collective media plans across their media and resilience staff.
The LRF warning and informing strategy is linked with the Community Risk Register and includes consideration of any other risks from outside the area that may have an impact.
The LRF has established a programme to prioritise, test, exercise and validate its public information delivery, involving, where appropriate, independent or external peer reviews.
The LRF uses validated information from different sources to assess the effectiveness and impact of public information strategies.
The LRF ensures public transparency with regard to effective, exercised and up-to-date plans for

---

[48] Regulation 32
[49] Regulation 45; *Emergency Preparedness*, Chapter 3
[50] CPNI guidance on the disclosure into the public domain of sensitive information

both response and recovery.
Independent research and customer satisfaction surveys show that the public feels well informed.

Duty to promote business continuity (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 8: Business continuity advice and assistance to business and the voluntary sector)

62. The duty to promote BCM[51] rests with local authorities, and other Category 1 responders must co-operate with local authorities to enable them to perform this duty.[52]

63. Local authorities must provide general advice and assistance on BCM to the business community and voluntary organisations, but they may also do so to individual organisations on request (for which local authorities may make a charge to recover costs).

64. LRFs are the principal conduit for responders to collaborate and co-operate with one another. The LRF therefore has a role in facilitating the promotion of BCM information and advice in order to minimise the economic impact of emergencies on the local community.

Business continuity promotion mandatory requirements
Local authorities must provide advice and assistance on BCM to the public, commerce and voluntary organisations prior to an emergency.[53]
Business continuity promotion issues to consider
The LRF should collectively identify local authorities in the area that are not promoting business continuity in accordance with the CCA and work with them to identify a solution before considering escalating the issue.
The LRF should be aware of BCM and support the promotion of BCM in its area.
The LRF should, where necessary, support local authorities in developing collaborative arrangements with other responders to provide or signpost BCM advice and assistance.[54]
The LRF should ensure that BCM promotion strategies have been developed with regard to the Community Risk Register, and that any risks outside the local area that may have an impact on BCM have also been considered.[55]

---

[51] CCA, Section 4
[52] Regulation 41
[53] Regulation 39(2); *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraphs 8.1–8.7
[54] Regulations 41(3) and 41(4); *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraphs 8.12 and 8.38
[55] Regulation 38

The LRF should consider co-ordinating arrangements with local authorities to ensure that the BCM promotion programme for the area is adequate and coherent; roles and any delegated responsibilities are clear; review and evaluation mechanisms are in place; and, where necessary, senior officers or elected members are involved in the process.[56]

The LRF should collectively ensure that BCM promotion messages are consistent; the means of delivery are appropriately co-ordinated; external partners are not unduly burdened; lessons are learned; and good practice is shared.

The LRF should have processes in place to inform BCM promotion strategies, making available accurate shared information about other Category 1 responder plans and arrangements.

The LRF should collectively ensure that national guidance has been considered in the BCM promotion strategy being used and that it is effective in reaching the appropriate audience(s).

Business continuity promotion indicators of good practice

The LRF collaborates with other multi-agency partnerships (such as the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership) in developing BCM promotion.

The LRF is able collectively to identify local authorities that are not fulfilling their duty to promote BCM advice and assistance, and has procedures in place to provide and broker support or to escalate concerns where necessary.

Local partners among media organisations have been engaged and are committed to the LRF media plans for sharing information.

LRF member organisations have developed a shared understanding and commitment to collective media plans across their media and resilience staff.

The LRF has developed work with other organisations representing or engaging with the business community.

The BCM promotion strategy is linked with the Community Risk Register and includes consideration of any other risks from outside the area that may have an impact.

The LRF members collaborate in sharing BCM plans and information supporting the promotion of BCM advice and assistance to the wider business and voluntary community.

Area BCM promotion strategies also engage partner organisations to provide and promulgate BCM information and advice.

The LRF uses validated information from different sources to assess the effectiveness and impact of BCM promotion strategies.

Duty to share information (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 3: Formal information sharing)

65. The need to share information is crucial and rests with both Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Information sharing encompasses liaison and updating between organisations, and formal or informal contacts, and includes the exchange of knowledge, understanding, advice and data.

---

[56] Regulation 41(1); *Emergency Preparedness*, paragraph 8.40

66. Responders may request information from another responder that is necessary to perform their civil contingencies duties and which is not available through other routes. The information cannot be used for other purposes without prior agreement.

67. Responders and LRFs should consider the most appropriate way of sharing information using the guidance contained in *Emergency Preparedness*.

Information sharing mandatory requirements
Category 1 and 2 responders are empowered to request information from another responder in connection with a duty under Section 2(1) or 4(1) of the CCA or another function which relates to an emergency.
Category 1 and 2 responders must provide the information requested within a reasonable time or explain the reasons for not doing so.[57]
Sensitive information must be kept confidential and be used only for the purpose or function for which it was provided.[58]
The Community Risk Register must be shared with LRFs with whom a geographical boundary is shared.[59] The Community Risk Register must also be copied to the CCS.
Category 1 responders must arrange to publish risk assessments (forming all or part of the Community Risk Register collectively through the LRF).[60]
Information sharing issues to consider
The LRF should collectively identify where information sharing between responders is not operating in accordance with the CCA.
The LRF must use effective mechanisms to share counter terrorism security advice between partners while preserving confidentiality in sensitive intelligence matters.
The LRF should collectively ensure that it adheres to the Security Policy Framework and 'core principles' set out in national guidance.[61]
The LRF should collectively enable responders to share information about plans and issues outside their responsibilities and specialist areas, and it should be a forum for sharing and discussing local issues providing information and feedback to and from the other resilience tiers.
The LRF should ensure that it has protocols in place for vetting, handling sensitive information, data protection and FOI requests.
The LRF should encourage organisations to meet their responsibilities under the CCA. It should monitor the response, escalating their concerns if they are severe or not resolved, and de-escalate issues as and when resolved.
The LRF should use document protective marking, and adopt effective procedures and systems to ensure that access to shared information is provided to all those who have a business need.
The LRF should ensure that appropriate security control is in place, and active considerations should include sanitising contents so that where possible:

---

[57] Regulation 49
[58] Regulation 51
[59] Regulation 16
[60] CCA, Section 2(1)(f); Regulation 27
[61] *https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework*

- a lower protective marking may be applied to enable wider access to information between partners; and

- partners are not deluged with unnecessary or unmanageable information.

Information sharing indicators of good practice

The LRF uses information sharing agreements and protocols between its members or other bodies that avoids duplicating information requests, optimises co-operation for civil protection purposes and complies with security principles.

The LRF is able collectively to identify where information sharing is an issue, and has procedures in place to provide and broker support or to escalate concerns where necessary.

The LRF has an effective network of emergency planners which fosters good working relationships below the strategic level of the LRF/SCG/RCG, so that trust and confidence are in place from the outset of an emergency.

The LRF provides the balance between working at local and other tiers, which fosters good planning and working relationships at both tiers while avoiding unnecessary duplication or counter-productive work.

The LRF routinely uses meetings to establish and maintain effective working relationships between the personnel who may become members of an SCG and/or an RCG, so that trust and confidence are in place from the outset of an emergency.

The LRF uses the National Resilience Extranet for electronic information exchange between LRF members and other tiers, and has usage protocols in place.

The LRF has developed meaningful information sharing protocols with neighbouring LRFs and organisations operating at other tiers.

The LRF uses periodic checks, tests and exercises, including independent examination and peer review processes, to ensure that information sharing for civil protection purposes is being undertaken appropriately and is complying with national security guidance.

Duty to co-operate (This section should be read in conjunction with Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2: Co-operation)

68. The scope and effectiveness of co-operation between the different public, private and voluntary agencies or organisations is a critical success factor in the preparation and response to an emergency. This is reflected in the CCA, which imposes co-operation as an important duty for both Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

69. The duty is enforceable, and requires responders to take advantage of the recognised benefits of collective approaches in preparation and the joint multi-agency response at the time of an emergency.

70. In addition to requiring co-operative interaction between different organisations, either directly or through managed arrangements, it is essential that there is co-operation between

separate parts of the same organisation as necessary to achieve a common purpose in an emergency.

71. The LRF and its subsidiary groups represent significant opportunities for co-operation through managed arrangements, but each organisation will also need to consider how it ensures co-operation in preparation or response to an emergency, examining internal structures and policies as well as the quality of direct interactions with other organisations and agencies.

72. It is intended that, by co-operation through the LRF, duty-holders will be supported so that they perform their legal responsibilities better than they would acting on their own.[62]

Co-operation mandatory requirements
Category 1 responders must co-operate with one another in connection with the performance of their duties under Section 2(1) of the CCA; must ensure that their LRF meets at least once every six months; and must attend or be represented at the LRF meetings.[63]
Category 2 responders must co-operate with each Category 1 responder in their area in connection with the performance of their duties under Section 2(1) of the CCA; and, when invited, must attend or be represented at the LRF meetings.[64]
Category 2 responders must also co-operate with each other as necessary to enable fulfilment of their duties under Regulation 4(2)
The LRF must represent all Category 1 and 2 responders covering the whole or part of its area.

Co-operation issues to consider
Category 1 and 2 responders' representatives attending the LRF meetings should be senior strategic managers of their organisation and have authority from their organisation to: • agree mutual aims and objectives; and • commit their organisation and its resources to the LRF's projects and activities.
LRF members should have authority from organisations in their sector (where appropriate) to take part in the forum on their behalf and should be able to explain civil contingencies issues affecting their sector or organisation.
LRF members should ensure that the organisation(s) they represent are fully informed of the LRF's business, and should facilitate the process for the organisation(s) they represent to provide input to the LRF's business, either through them or in person.
The LRF should engender positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding in order to facilitate information sharing and deliver effective solutions to issues as they arise.

---

[62] CCA, Section 2(5)(h)
[63] Regulation 4
[64] Regulation 4

The LRF should enable responders to meet their responsibilities in a coherent, consistent and complementary manner through the development of protocols, where necessary.

The LRF should collectively identify organisations that are not co-operating in compliance with the CCA and encourage organisations to meet their responsibilities.

The LRF should understand its role and how it complements the work of the other civil contingency tiers, and should include representatives of organisations that can contribute to its work (such as the Armed Forces and the voluntary sector). It should consider the needs of the member organisations participating in more than one forum. In particular, it should consider:

- whether they can be effectively and efficiently represented by a partner organisation from their sector;

- whether such responders can deliver their responsibilities more effectively through another organisation and therefore be delegated to it; and

- how to ensure that the responder and the forum remain actively engaged with each other; the need for every responder wholly within its area to attend meetings; and whether they can be effectively represented by a partner organisation from their sector in order to avoid placing excessive demands on each other.

Co-operation indicators of good practice

The LRF periodically seeks the views of its members to check for issues, and tests positive engagement and co-operation across different parts of organisations and between different organisations.

The LRF has protocols in place in relation to:

- information sharing between Category 1 and Category 2 responders;

- multi-agency emergency planning arrangements;

- communication planning generally;

- managing the response to an emergency; and

- communicating with the public.

The LRF members have co-operated to strengthen the LRF and LRF sub-groups by drawing up a formal, binding agreement between responders.

Category 1 responders have co-operated through the LRF to formally agree and allocate lead responsibility roles among responders for particular duties under the CCA.

The LRF collectively, or members individually, have sought and established necessary cross-boundary or cross-border protocols with neighbouring organisations.

The LRF includes representatives from organisations not within the scope of the CCA (such as military and voluntary organisations) as main forum and sub-group members, where those organisations can contribute to the work of the LRF.

The LRF promotes generic multi-agency training focused on strengthening partnerships.

The LRF collectively:

- identifies organisations where co-operation can be developed by highlighting strengths to build on and weaknesses to remedy;

- offers organisations support to improve performance directly, or by brokering support from another source; and

- monitors the impact of the support given to organisations.

The LRF has collective processes in place to:

- encourage organisations to meet their responsibilities under the CCA;

- raise concerns formally with organisations if they are not resolved through informal contact and

encouragement;

- monitor the response to any informal or formal contact with an organisation about their concerns;

- escalate concerns if they are severe or not resolved; and

- delegate issues as and when they are resolved.

The LRF collectively ensures that interoperability[65], cross-agency and cross-specialist co-operation issues are tested and exercised, lessons are learned and necessary change is implemented.

Training events and workshops are used to promote shared understanding between partner agencies, or with other partnerships and to raise awareness of resilience issues among staff not directly involved in civil contingencies planning.

---

[65] Interoperability is defined as 'the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of course'. While the term is not referred to in the CCA, it relates fundamentally to cooperation in emergency preparedness, response and recovery and a programme has been established to enhance interoperability between the emergency services and address persistent shortcomings in the multi-agency response to emergencies. The Emergency Services should note the work of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) (*www.jesip.org.uk)* and products to enhance interoperability will be issued during 2013-14.

Part 2: The role of an LRF in the Resilience Capabilities Programme

Introduction

77.   The Resilience Capabilities Programme is a cross-government programme of work, managed by the Cabinet Office. The programme aims to build capability to meet the requirements of the National Resilience Planning Assumptions[66] and therefore to ensure that there is a robust infrastructure of response and recovery in place to deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with the consequences of all kinds of civil emergencies, including both threats and hazards. Some of the work LRFs undertake as their duties and/or as best practice ways of working contribute to the delivery of this programme.

78.   This section provides an overview of the role of LRFs from the perspective of the 22 workstreams within the Resilience Capabilities Programme. In some cases this is simply a link to useful guidance, should the LRF require it, whereas in others it links to specific duties under the CCA. The guidance in these tables is covered elsewhere in this document – the objective of the tables is to provide LRFs with insight about how their work feeds up to the national level.

A: Maintaining essential services	
Food & Water	The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is the lead government department for the Food & Water capability workstream. Defra continues to engage with LRFs and the sub-national tier (previously GOs) through the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED), both on a daily basis and in the event of emergencies. Water companies are Category 2 responders.
Transport	The Department for Transport (DfT) leads the Transport capability workstream. In the event of a major incident or emergency, DfT would initially approach the transport operators and network operators for a solution to the situation. It might be necessary for DfT to engage with LRFs in order to get additional information and assistance. However, this would normally be done via DCLG RED in the first instance, and LRFs should channel any queries to them.

---

[66] Restricted versions of the NRPAs are circulated to LRFs with the Local Risk Assessment Guidance each year

Financial Services	The Financial Services capability workstream is led by Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) which, along with the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, monitors the resilience of the finance sector. In the event of an an incident affecting the operations of the finance sector, the financial authorities will liaise with the sector to minimise disruption. Further information about continuity planning that is relevant to the UK's financial sector can be found at www.fsc.gov.uk.
Energy	The Energy capability workstream is led by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC); however, energy services in the UK are wholly privatised and therefore a range of private companies and government organisations are involved in emergency planning for the sector. In the private sector, this includes the National Grid, which maintains the national transmission networks for gas and electricity, and nine distribution network operators, which maintain the local distribution systems. In the public sector, Ofgem, the Health and Safety Executive and DECC all have roles in maintaining the resilience of UK energy supplies. Further information is available on the following websites:

https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/maintaining-uk-energy-security--2

www.nationalgrid.com/UK

www.hse.gov.uk/

www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/OfgemHome.aspx. |
| **Health** | The Department of Health leads the Health capability workstream, which focuses on the continuation and preservation of healthcare services to the community during a major disruptive event, which would likely result in widespread system failure, or a significant surge in demand on capacity or capability as a result of a mass casualty event. The NHS and partner organisations will need to ensure that they have robust business continuity arrangements in place to continue to deliver services to the community (primary, secondary and tertiary care).The NHS is being aligned to British Standard BS25999, known as **BS NHS 25999**. Further information is available at http://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/gov/eprr/

LRF members should be aware of the local health service arrangements and ensure that any mutual aid arrangements recognise both the diverse delivery of healthcare and the relevant community partnerships. |
| **Telecommunications and Postal Services** | The Telecommunications and Postal Services capability workstream is led by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). There is an expectation that each LRF will establish a Telecommunications Sub-Group (TSG). The role of the LRF TSG is to ensure that local responders and their partners are able to communicate effectively even when faced with the most challenging circumstances. TSGs were invited to develop a plan to enhance the resilience of telecommunications in their area of responsibility. Information on this plan can be obtained at

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-resilience-forums-telecommunications-sub-groups.

The plan is a live document and will be updated as experience is gained through testing and exercising the arrangements, and as circumstances change. |

B: Functional workstreams	
Animal Diseases	Defra leads the Animal Diseases capability workstream. Defra continues to engage with the sub-national tier (previously GOs) through the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) on a regular basis, and daily in the event of emergencies. In addition, the Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA) has established links at LRF level on animal disease issues. LRFs should continue to maintain these existing relationships and contact Defra via their sub-national office if they require further information. LRFs should also continue to engage with animal health regional operations directors and engage as appropriate with the Local Disease Control Centre should it be activated, to ensure that the wider consequences of an animal disease outbreak are factored in to the response.
CBRN	The Home Office leads the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) capability workstream. Its CBRN Resilience Programme seeks to build and improve the UK's ability to respond to and recover from a terrorist CBRN attack, and as part of this programme the Government has equipped 18 sites nationwide with trained officers to improve the multi-agency response to such an attack. LRFs are expected to be aware of the work being driven by the Home Office at a national level and, more specifically (if located in one of the 18 key sites), to understand what is expected of them in this regard.
Flooding	Defra is the lead department for the Flooding capability workstream, working closely with both the Environment Agency and the Cabinet Office. LRFs are encouraged to develop a specific multi-agency flood plan to both complement other plans and provide more detail to generic major incident plans or strategic emergency response plans. Revised guidance to support the preparation of the multi-agency flood plans is at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/developing-a-multi-agency-flood-plan-mafp-guidance-for-local-resilience-forums-and-emergency-planners. LRFs are encouraged to use the National Flood Emergency Framework for England, which was published in July 2010, to assist all those involved in flood planning and resilience. It brings together information, guidance and key policies and acts as a resource at all levels. The Framework can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-flood-emergency-framework-for-england. All LRFs are encouraged to write **generic** off-site plans for reservoir emergencies. LRFs with the highest-priority reservoirs in their area have been funded to produce **specific** off-site plans for reservoir emergencies. Guidance and templates to assist emergency planners to produce emergency plans can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/reservoir-off-site-plans-documents.

Evacuation & Shelter	The Cabinet Office is the lead department for the Evacuation Shelter capability workstream. From the perspective of this workstream, an LRF should: • know that relevant Category 1 responders have adequate evacuation plans that meet the risks identified in the Community Risk Register and that the evacuation plans have regard to the following guidance: *Evacuation and Shelter Guidance*; *Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance*; *Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis*; and *Mutual Aid*; and • provide a forum for developing multi-agency evacuation plans, and sharing best practice and lessons learned on evacuation.
Mass Casualties	The Department of Health leads the Mass Casualties capability workstream. A characteristic of many of the risks to the UK is their potential to cause very large numbers of complex casualties, possibly on an unprecedented scale and well in excess of individual NHS organisations' conventional 'major incident' response capability. It is therefore important that LRF members consider the full scale and scope of the NHS response that would be required to handle casualties on such a scale, and the range of organisations that might be involved. This would be likely to extend to primary care, social care, and independent or third sector partners.
Site Clearance	The Department for Communities and Local Government leads the Site Clearance capability workstream. Guidance about site clearance can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-development-of-a-site-clearance-capability-in-england-and-wales. Annex A of the guidance giving details on roles and responsibilities of Category 1 and Category 2 responders has been updated (August 2012) and can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-development-of-a-site-clearance-capability-in-england-and-wales-annex-a. Local Resilience Forums are expected to have developed their own Site Clearance plans taking account of the national guidance and their own local risk profile. Plans should include details of contractors to be used both for general site clearance activity and decontamination provision. In developing plans and appointing contractors it is important that LRFs are aware of the provisions being made by bordering LRFs to ensure that contractors are not over committed in the case of a wide area event (e.g. coastal flooding) The national guidance is due to be revised and reissued during 2013.

Mass Fatalities	The Home Office leads the Mass Fatalities capability workstream. Many of the risks in the National Risk Assessment have the potential to cause mass fatalities. LRFs are expected to have mass fatality plans at a tactical level, agreed by all Category 1 responders and exercised, that: • make clear what capability is held by Category 1 responders within the LRF, who is responsible for providing it, and how it will be accessed in event of an incident; and • spell out the arrangements for accessing additional capability, through mutual aid or regional solutions, to increase effectively capacity to respond to one or more of these incidents. LRF mass fatality plans should cover the full range of capability but particularly information and communications, infrastructure, equipment, logistics, personnel and training/exercising. The key strategic guidance to LRFs on planning for mass fatality incidents is the joint Home Office and Cabinet Office publication *Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies*. An updated framework will replace this guidance and will be published during 2013. The extent of national-level capability held by the Home Office (e.g. the National Emergency Mortuary Arrangements) and the preparations which Category 1 responders need to make to access are set out in the Home Office guidance document *Supplementing Local Response Options* (Restricted), which is available via the National Resilience Extranet (NRE).. While national-level capability may be increased, LRFs are expected to work in parallel in order to increase their capacity to respond to mass fatality incidents. LRFs may choose to work with others in their region to share access to capability, providing they act in line with coronial legislation and make clear in their plans how they will access capability which they do not hold themselves.
Infectious Diseases	The Department of Health is the lead government department for the Infectious Diseases capability workstream, working closely with the Cabinet Office, and Public Health England. A programme of work is underway through the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) to identify the potential for new and emerging infectious disease. Under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the NHS Commissioning Board and Public Health England will each be responsible for ensuring that they are adequately prepared for and able to respond to a wide range of emergencies. They will work together at all levels and with local authorities, and will coordinate emergency response at the LRF, sub-national and national levels. This should include planning for an infectious disease outbreak and having systems in place to report significant outbreaks of infection to their local health protection unit. This will also include a multi-agency plan specifically to deal with an influenza pandemic, which is judged to be one of the highest current risks to the UK and has the potential to impact on all localities. A pandemic influenza plan should reflect the UK strategic objectives which are set out in the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011. The development, maintenance and testing of local level multi-agency plans plays a crucial role in ensuring that the objectives set out in the UK Strategy can be met in the event of a pandemic. All LRFs are also encouraged to write plans for infectious disease risks, which would require a response quite different to a response to an influenza pandemic, taking into account the scenarios agreed with the ACDP in 2013. As part of the Public Health Outcomes Framework, Local Authorities and others will also be expected to provide assurances that plans are in place across the system.

C: Structural workstreams

Central (national) Response	The Cabinet Office is the lead government department for Central Response and supports central government departments in working together effectively when responding to an emergency. It does this by creating crisis management arrangements that are understood and used across all of central government.
Local Resilience	The Cabinet Office and Department for Communities and Local Government jointly are lead government departments for local resilience capability. Together they offer support and guidance to local resilience partners in England so they can carry out their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) to plan for, respond to and recover from emergencies; encourage responders to work together across agencies and areas; and make sure that the local and national levels are joined up in the response to an emergency.

D: Supporting workstreams

Humanitarian Assistance	The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) leads the Humanitarian Assistance capability workstream. LRFs would be expected to respond to any incident by taking care of the needs of people. LRFs should implement the multi-agency plans that they have developed, ensuring that the immediate, medium and long-term needs of people are taken care of (including the handover to core services for longer-term care). Guidance to support this planning is at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/humanitarian-assistance-in-emergencies. The 2011 strategic guidance on humanitarian assistance provides further background on considerations for medium and longer-term care, psychosocial issues and exit strategies. A sharepoint to complement the guidance has also been developed; this provides an online resource providing access to further tools on how others have handled aspects of humanitarian assistance.
Interoperability	The Cabinet Office leads on Interoperability and co-ordinates developments across government, supporting the delivery of compatible and coherent systems, procedures and equipment to enable emergency responders to conduct large scale joint operations efficiently in the response to major emergencies. The interoperability workstream operates in collaboration with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) and other specialist response initiatives.

Warning & Informing

The Cabinet Office leads the Warning &Informing capability workstream. Its primary function is to assist Category 1 responders to discharge their duties with regard to communicating with the public under the CCA (as set out earlier at paragraph 63 onwards). LRFs should consider using the 10-step cycle which sets out a step-by-step process to meet these requirements.

LRFs should arrange for the production and publication of a Community Risk Register.

LRFs should ensure that public information is regularly reviewed and renewed whenever necessary.

LRFs should encourage responders to identify a number of methods to warn and inform to ensure that the widest population at risk is captured, including vulnerable groups etc. Responders should consider the effectiveness and resilience of the various systems. LRFs should ensure that Category 1 responders work together to identify and agree a lead responder for particular emergencies and that appropriate plans, protocols and systems are in place to undertake the duty to communicate with the public effectively. These arrangements should be regularly reviewed and exercised.

Category 1 responders should be familiar with the media organisations and outlets in their area and develop good relations with them.

LRFs should seek to have greater consistency of approach and to generate a common standard of service to stakeholders across the country.

LRFs should spread best practice and advice beyond their areas to all tiers.

Recovery

The Cabinet Office is the lead department for the Recovery capability workstream. It is responsible for the co-ordination of the National Recovery Guidance (NRG) which contains advice on recovering from emergencies and planning for recovery. The NRG includes topic sheets, case studies, guidance on recovery reporting and recovery funding, and a template recovery plan. The NRG can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance

Emergencies within one Local Authority's boundaries

The local authority is the agency responsible for planning for the recovery of the community following any major emergency, supported by other local partners via the Local Resilience Forums (LRFs). In most cases it will be sensible for top tier authorities to lead, but all local authorities and Category 1 responders should input. If there is more than one top tier local authority in the LRF they should work together to co-ordinate recovery planning.

Following an emergency, the local authority will usually co-ordinate the multi-agency recovery process, including chairing and providing the secretariat for the RCG, with support from the full range of multi-agency partners as necessary.

Emergencies crossing local authority boundaries in England

Where the emergency crosses a local authority boundary but remains within one LRF area, the affected authorities will need to decide whether to establish one RCG at LRF level, or whether to operate separate RCGs in each local authority area. To ensure there is consistency of approach, no duplication of effort, and to reduce the burden on agencies that cover more than one local authority area, the recommended approach would be to have one RCG to cover all the affected communities within the LRF area. In this instance, it would be sensible for all the affected local authorities to designate a lead local authority that would provide the RCG Chair and Secretariat.

Where the emergency crosses LRF boundaries consideration should be given to the potential assistance that a Multi-LRF RCG could provide in ensuring consistency of approach, reducing duplication of effort, minimising the burden on responders, and facilitating the sharing of information, support and mutual aid.

Community & Corporate Resilience

The Cabinet Office leads the Community & Corporate Resilience workstream delivering the Government's contribution to build and enhance community and corporate resilience across the UK. There is no legislative duty on responders to promote community resilience. However, there are good examples from all over the country of community resilience activities, enhancing responders' ability to successfully deliver their statutory duties and improving the strength and well-being of the community they serve.

LRFs are asked to continue to fulfil the duties set out in the CCA on warning and informing the public. They may also wish to consider involving members of the community in assessing risk and finding other ways of building community resilience.

LRFs are invited to consider how they might build on existing good practice in their area to establish and enhance community resilience through a number of methods. These could include responding to queries from interested communities, promoting community resilience at community events, circulating template plans or involving the community in training and exercising.

In spring 2011, the Community Resilience Programme published a national set of documents providing information for the public on how they can become better prepared to deal with the impacts of emergencies.

Resilient Telecommunications

The Resilient telecommunications workstream is led by the Cabinet Office and is responsible for supporting responder organisations in their efforts to enhance the resilience of local telecommunications. The ability to communicate and share information underpins the response to emergencies. LRFs should understand the range of communication tools available to them, and have arrangements in place to deal with those occasions when they are unavailable or when heavily congested networks make communications difficult. Local TSGs, working under the auspices of the LRF, are asked to agree, put in place and actively maintain local plans for communications. The LRFs are also requested to understand the communications dependencies within other local plans and understand the risks to these.

In support of this activity, further information, including Telecommunications Sub Group contact directory, can be found on the UK Resilience website at

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-resilience-forums-telecommunications-sub-groups

In recent years, the Cabinet Office has held an event, at least annually, for TSG chairs, and periodic training events, supported and/or provided by major industry players, to help to improve understanding of communications technologies among the responder community. In addition, the Resilient Telecommunications team engages widely with government and responder organisations globally, as well as with industry, to ensure that the advice and guidance they provide is up to date and that communications resilience in the UK meets as high a standard as possible. To continue to meet high standards, however, local responder organisations need to engage and participate in communications planning, exercising and testing in their areas.

Airwave, as the common, secure digital radio platform for emergency responders, provides an opportunity for users to improve joint working and the way in which information is shared during response. Each LRF area should appoint a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) to champion the development of local standard operating procedures for using Airwave in a multi-agency setting, making due regard to the nationally provided guidance. The SRO will then oversee the adoption of these procedures by LRF member organisations.

In summary, the LRF should:

- ensure that they have an active TSG in their area that meets on a regular basis;

- have confidence that the TSG engages with LRF members to develop and maintain plans and to share the plans with other relevant responder partners; and

- identify a multi-agency Airwave SRO to champion the development and embedding of local standard operating procedures.

Part 3: The role of the LRF and the SCG in emergency response and recovery

Introduction

79. This section focuses on the role of the LRF relating to response to and recovery from emergencies. Since emergency response and recovery are not statutory duties under the CCA, the guidance outlined in this section is based on the non-statutory emergency response and recovery guidance and information, together with the National Recovery Guidance and supporting information. However, responders are encouraged to view the CCA in the wider context of Integrated Emergency Management – a holistic approach to preventing and managing emergencies that entails six key steps: anticipation; assessment; prevention;[67] preparation; response; and recovery.

How to use this guidance

80. The content of this section is based on Emergency Response and Recovery Since lessons are continuously being learned with regard to response and recovery, this section does not refer to any specific aspect of emergency management but concentrates instead on generic principles. Throughout this section, cross-references to associated, more detailed guidance is provided in case more detail is required. Details about our most-up-to-date advice on specific aspects of emergency response and recovery can be found at https://www.gov.uk/emergency-response-and-recovery.

81. In this section, the term '**facilities**' is used. There are several types of emergency operational facilities. Each responder typically has its own emergency control centre which, where appropriate, feeds into multi-agency facilities at a tactical or strategic level (e.g. Strategic Co-ordination Centres or Recovery Co-ordination Centres). Operational facilities may also be provided in the form of, for example, rest centres and temporary mortuaries. Where the term

---

[67] Although the CCA regime includes the duty to plan for emergencies so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing the emergency; reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects; or taking other action in connection with it, it does not cover taking preventive action (such as building coastal defences)

'facility' is used, it is in a generic sense.

82.   Similarly, in this section we also use the generic term '**co-ordinating group**' to cover both single-sector and multi-agency groups, and groups which operate at a strategic, tactical or operational level for response or recovery.

83.   There may be occasions when a facility cannot be used or may have to be relocated at very short notice. Under these circumstances, the SCG/RCG chair should seek advice from the military Joint Regional Liaison Officer, who can provide guidance on how to quickly establish or move a command and control centre.

Overall principles of response

84.   The duty to assess risk (Sections 2(1)(a) and (b) of the CCA) provides a common framework for ongoing risk identification and analysis for preparing for emergencies. This framework should help to provide a solid platform from which preparations for responding to and recovering from emergencies can be made.

85.   In addition to having a role in periods of planning and preparation, anticipation is also important during both emergency response and recovery (see below).

Risk identification	
For your responders	Category 1 responders should conduct ongoing risk identification and assessment before, during the response to, and during the recovery from, an emergency so that they: • have a good appreciation of the dynamic risk environment in which they operate as established risks recede, new risks emerge and the balance between risks changes; and • are able, as far as is reasonable, to foresee potential consequences and develop solutions which assist rather than obstruct effective operations. •
For your LRF	The LRF (particularly when operating as part of an SCG or an RCG) should collectively: • have a good appreciation of the dynamic risk environment in which they operate as established risks recede, new risks emerge and the balance between risks changes; • enable responders to be aware of the issues beyond their responsibilities and specialism (see Part 1); and • enable responders to be aware of the National Recovery Guidance and to have a recovery plan that identifies roles and responsibilities.
	The LRF should share risk information with neighbouring LRFs and the Sub-national Resilience Forum.[68]

---

[68] Source: Regulation 18

86. The response to any emergency or major incident needs to be managed flexibly and should reflect the circumstances at the time. No two incidents are the same. Although it is advisable to be aware of how previous incidents and exercise scenarios have been managed, there should always be a fresh assessment of the current incident according to its nature and scale.

87. The CCA and its supporting Regulations and guidance provide a consistent framework for preparing for emergencies at a local level. See Part 1 for details.

88. The co-operation and information sharing processes are designed to ensure that there is a co-ordinated, consistent approach to emergency preparedness. These processes also help to ensure that unnecessary duplications are avoided and capability gaps are filled.

89. As some capability gaps need to be addressed at other tiers (such as when a local area could potentially be overwhelmed), local responders should feed into the National Resilience Capabilities Programme. (LRF advice relating to this is outlined in Part 2 of this document.)

90. Preparedness is not just about having risk assessments, plans and arrangements in place; it is also about being able to respond efficiently and effectively to emergencies (foreseen or unforeseen).

91. The National Recovery Guidance shows how the processes listed above can be applied to recovery planning. This guidance also provides further details on the recovery planning process. Recovery is best achieved where the recovery process begins from the moment the emergency begins. It is recommended that the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) is set up on the first day of the emergency and run in parallel with the SCG.

92. In addition to the overarching processes outlined above, there are also a number of detailed practical considerations and other processes not covered by the CCA regime, which are necessary to ensure effective emergency management. These additional considerations are outlined in the table below.

Being ready to respond to and recover from an emergency	
For your responders	Category 1 responders should: • have a plan identifying the resources required and any gaps; • train and exercise staff; • have a process for updating plans and capability assessments; and • be ready to respond. This should enable them to respond to and recover from emergencies (foreseen or unforeseen) in

For your LRF	an effective manner.
	LRFs should: • ensure that plans encompass the role, purpose and operation of the SCG; • ensure that plans enable interoperability, including a mechanism to develop and maintain Shared Situational Awareness[69]. • identify and document responder capacity to respond and recover from an emergency, and plan where an emergency may exceed their capacity; • identify other resources required and plan for accessing them; • identify and document individuals for each of the roles within the SCG; • facilitate handover between the response, recovery and regeneration phases; • plan for recovery from emergencies through either a chapter in the generic major incident plan or a separate recovery plan; • exercise and test recovery plans; • facilitate the debriefs and implement identified processes learned from response and recovery exercises and operations; • incorporate lessons learned in updated plans; and • test and validate updated plans.

For your LRF	In order to ensure that the area is prepared, LRFs should (under the principle of locally led assurance and improvement): • identify organisations that are not prepared; • raise their concerns with the organisation informally or formally; • offer direct support to the organisation, or to broker support from elsewhere; • monitor the response from the organisation; • de-escalate, maintain or escalate the issue as appropriate; and • share examples of good practice.
Outside your area	Neighbouring LRFs should have the joint capacity and resources to do the following in an emergency which could overwhelm one or more of an individual LRF's area or resources: • establish lines of communication between the different civil contingency tiers; • ensure that plans support interoperability with neighbouring SCGs, including mechanisms to share information to inform Shared Situational Awareness; • work with staff deployed in a Government Liaison Team or as Government Liaison Officers; • contribute to briefing and informing the ministers and Members of Parliament; • assist and advise on media handling and public messages; and • work with partners to support consequence management and recovery efforts, including identifying regional priorities and targeting resources.

Strategic Co-ordinating Group

93. The LRF should establish an SCG (classed as a Gold Command Group) and appoint a chair, in order to respond to an emergency or major incident effectively. The main purpose of the SCG is to provide strategic leadership throughout the course of an emergency and/or major

---

[69] Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) is a term used to describe a collective view and understanding of an emergency, its consequences, potential outcomes and associated risks, together with an understanding of what is being done and what needs to be done to resolve the situation, including each responder's part in its achievement.

incident; it should not concern itself with the tactical (Silver) or operational (Bronze) issues.

94. The SCG should:

- agree mutual strategic priorities in responding to the incident;

- determine policy for implementation by Tactical Commanders/Tactical Co-ordinating Groups;

- arrange and allocate adequate resources to the tactical level;

- implement adequate financial controls;

- act as an interface with other tiers and national government departments;

- develop and maintain Shared Situational Awareness across all partner agencies;

- liaise with neighbouring LRFs or partner agencies;

- co-ordinate communications both internally and externally; and

- facilitate media liaison at a strategic level.

95. LRFs should have a generic emergency/major incident SCG activation plan that includes a defined threshold for declaring SCG activation. The threshold should be appropriate and proportionate to the nature and type of incident. It should also include a single point of contact, such as a police communications duty officer, who should be in a position to contact all core members (including outside of office hours) with a view to, where necessary, establishing an SCG within one hour during office hours and two hours outside of office hours. The early activation of the command and control structures and the early formation of an SCG to co-ordinate the response of all agencies has many advantages.

96. When activating an SCG, the LRF partners collectively should consider:

- who provides the building, equipment and IT support;

- who provides resources and staff (including the chair and the secretariat);

- who provides support, including a multi-agency logistics team; and

- who provides financial support.

97. SCG membership may vary according to the scale and nature of the incident. It will usually be a multi-agency forum drawn from Category 1 and 2 responders (including the military). The group must remain a strategic co-ordination body, with members holding executive positions within their own organisations. Expert advisers from other organisations, such as the Scientific

and Technical Advice Cell, may also attend the SCG when deemed necessary.

98. The number and frequency of meetings will vary depending on the type of incident and will be determined by the SCG chair. All meetings must be recorded and a log of decisions maintained. An example of an SCG agenda is as follows:

Item	Description	Lead
1	Introductions/Roles/Responsibilities	Chair
2	Urgent items for attention	Chair
3	Decisions on urgent items	Chair
Break to action urgent items as at 2 and 3 above		
4	Review and agree previous minutes	Chair
5	Update on current situation or Shared Situational Awareness	Chief of staff
6	Review and agree strategic priorities	Chair
7	Review outstanding actions	Chair
8	Updates from working groups/sub-groups	Group chairs
9	Discuss and agree decisions /actions	All
10	Next meeting	Chair

SCG responsibilities

99. When responding to an incident, the overall priority for all agencies, whether Category 1 or 2 responders, must be to save life.

100. There are numerous strategic priorities that may be considered during the initial response to an emergency or major incident. The list at paragraph 54 is not meant to be exhaustive but may prove a useful guide when setting the strategic priorities for the SCG.

101. The Strategic (Gold) Commander for each organisation will identify and set the overall strategic priorities for its organisation and will ensure that they are recorded and communicated to all other responders. The SCG must ratify the overall aim and the strategic intentions of the Group, regularly conducting reviews throughout the emergency or major incident.

102. It is likely that members of the SCG may also represent their organisation at LRF

meetings. If the LRF membership is, as it should be, made up from the strategic leadership of the relevant organisations, then the transition to an SCG will be a relatively smooth one. It is essential that there are clear and accountable decision-making processes throughout the response and recovery phases. Contemporaneous, accurate and auditable records of all decisions and rationale must be kept by the Group.

103. All decisions must be:

- proportionate;

- necessary;

- recorded; and

- legal.

104. LRF chairs should ensure that all members of the Forum and those who will form the core membership of the SCG regularly attend relevant exercises, develop and maintain relevant skills and resilience knowledge, have had the opportunity of training together and attend multi-agency command training.

105. LRF chairs should ensure that they have information sharing protocols in place before any emergency or major incident takes place. Consideration should be given throughout to the security classification of information. While information security should not be sacrificed, the effective running of an incident must not be compromised through not sharing crucial information with other agencies.

Command and control

106. It is accepted that the police usually co-ordinate the response phase of an emergency or major incident. However, it should be recognised that there are some emergencies (such as pandemic influenza and animal diseases) that will be led by other responders or central government departments. A senior police officer will often chair the SCG, but it must be noted that a commander from one organisation has no jurisdiction over the resources of another.

107. The command structure of strategic/tactical/operational (Gold/Silver/Bronze) groups is well recognised among all emergency services and most responders. It is role specific rather than rank specific. Clarity around the span of command and control is essential and should be clearly articulated at the beginning of any emergency or major incident. The overriding principle should

be to establish clarity on who is in charge, and to decide how this is communicated to all responders.

108. Emergencies and major incidents often need command and control structures for extended periods of time. LRF plans must therefore take account of command resilience. While each case should be considered on its own merit, any handover of command must be formally documented and communicated accordingly.

Collaboration and co-ordination with other tiers and forums

109. It is well recognised that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level and that local responders should provide the bedrock for response on any scale. However, there are higher levels of co-ordination, such as the National Security Council, which may apply during a wide-area emergency, a national emergency or a major incident.

110. In England the DCLG RED team, and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, devolved administrations. They provide a link to central government departments for local responders.

111. Devolved administrations and DCLG RED may facilitate groups or mechanisms to co-ordinate emergencies that overwhelm individual LRF boundaries or resources (e.g. the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee). They will not take over command from the SCG, but may provide co-ordination of the response and recovery phases. They should:

- observe the principle of subsidiarity;

- complement existing mechanisms and arrangements;

- only meet in the most serious circumstances;

- advise on wider area priorities, guide deployment of resources and facilitate mutual aid;

- ensure effective communication flow; and

- oversee multi-LRF efforts.

112. Where an emergency has national implications or involves a number of government departments, then a lead government department will be appointed to oversee response and recovery. If the event is a major national emergency, then the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) may be activated to oversee the strategic issues. As in the case of wide-area emergencies, COBR will not assume a command function but will require information to ensure that senior ministers and the Cabinet are properly briefed. Further information can be found in the

113. If an SCG has been established, a Government Liaison Team, led by a Government Liaison Officer, may be dispatched to become the main liaison channel between the SCG and COBR. In the event of a nuclear incident, the Government Liaison Officer liaises with the SCG and the Nuclear Emergency Briefing Room at DECC.

114. LRF plans should take account of and refer to all levels of co-ordination structures.

115. LRF plans should include the following:

- a process map and operating procedures for each core role within the SCG;

- activation procedures for each core member of the SCG, which should be regularly reviewed and tested;

- identification of the roles within each organisation, including deputies;

- resilience and succession planning;

- identification of relevant training for each core member of the SCG;

- generic risk assessments for roles and potential locations that the SCG will operate from; and

- regular exercising of the roles in order to test the plans and to identify and implement learning from such exercises.

116. There will be a number of groups/teams that will operate to support the SCG. The list below, while not exhaustive, includes examples of such groups that should be catered for in LRF plans:

- intelligence;

- logistics;

- finance and legal;

- mass fatalities co-ordination;

- recovery;

- communication and media;

- government liaison;

- search and rescue;

- the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell;

- humanitarian assistance/reception centres;

- health, safety and welfare of responders;

- military operations; and

- business continuity.

117.   Each sub-group will have an identified chair who will sit on the SCG, with others providing direct links into the Tactical (Silver) and Operational (Bronze) groups as necessary. In addition, the SCG may require specific advice on other specialist roles depending on the nature and scale of the emergency or major incident.

118.   It is advisable for each LRF to identify what specialist roles they may need assistance from and arrange for presentations during the planning process so that they can be included in LRF plans. Examples of such roles are:

- disaster victim identification;

- in Scotland, the Procurator Fiscal and knowledge of the Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008;

- public order;

- firearms (the Conflict Management Model);

- urban search and rescue; and

- CBRN.

Recovery

119.   The purpose of the recovery process is to restore, rebuild and rehabilitate the community following an emergency. Recovery should be seen as integral part of the response process.

120.   The recovery process is usually co-ordinated by an RCG led by a designated local authority. There should be a formal handover between the SCG and the RCG in order to indicate clearly the change in responsibility. This will take place at a time that is mutually agreed by both the SCG and the local authority.

121.   There are several issues that should be considered when deciding to transfer

responsibility to the RCG. The list below is not exhaustive but provides some examples of what should be taken into account:

- life is no longer at risk;

- there is no serious public disorder in the area;

- 'blue light' services are no longer operating at a rescue phase level that requires co-ordination; and

- the relevant local authority is able to accept transfer of responsibility.

122. As part of the handover process, consideration needs to be given to how information collated as part of the response phase is effectively, efficiently and securely handed over to those responsible for managing the recovery phase and should ideally include an up-to-date impact assessment.

Principles

123. The principles of recovering from emergencies are as follows:

- Recovery is an enabling and supportive process, which allows individuals, families and communities to attain a proper level of functioning through the provision of information, specialist services and resources.

- Effective recovery requires the establishment of planning and management arrangements, which are accepted and understood by recovery agencies, the community and the Armed Forces (if deployed).

- Recovery management arrangements are most effective when they recognise the complex, dynamic and protracted nature of recovery processes and the changing needs of affected individuals, families and groups within the community over time.

- Recovery management is best approached from the perspective of community development and is most effective when conducted at a local level, with the active participation of the affected community and a strong reliance on local capacities and expertise. Recovery is not just a matter for the statutory agencies – the private sector, the voluntary sector and the wider community will play a crucial role.

- Recovery management is most effective when agencies involved in human welfare have a major role in all levels of decision-making which may influence the well-being and recovery of the affected community.

- Recovery is best achieved where the recovery process begins from the moment the emergency is identified. It is recommended that, if resources allow, the RCG is set up on the first day of the emergency.

- Recovery planning and management arrangements are most effective where they are supported by training programmes and exercises which ensure that the agencies and groups involved in the recovery process are properly prepared for their role.

- Recovery is most effective where recovery management arrangements provide a comprehensive and integrated framework for managing all potential emergencies and where assistance measures are provided in a timely, fair and equitable manner and are sufficiently flexible to respond to a diversity of community needs.

Recovery strategy

124. At the start of the recovery process, it is vital that a clear recovery strategy is developed and agreed. The recovery strategy could cover some, or all, of the following key objectives:

- An Impact Assessment (covering the impact on residents, businesses, infrastructure, environment, etc.) is carried out as soon as possible and is regularly updated.

- A concise, balanced, affordable recovery action plan is developed that can be quickly implemented, involves all agencies and fits the needs of the emergency.

- The community is fully involved in the recovery process.

- All agencies work closely with the community and those directly affected, including on the monitoring and protection of public health.

- Utilities (e.g. water) and transport networks are brought back into use as soon as practicable.

- A proactive and integrated framework of support to businesses is established.

- All affected areas are restored to an agreed standard so that they are suitable for use for their defined purposes.

- Environmental protection and recovery issues are co-ordinated.

- Information and media management of the recovery process is co-ordinated. The communication requirements will be different from the response phase with more emphasis on two-way communication and engagement, rather than the control/command and information provision more associated with the response phase.

- Effective protocols for political involvement and liaison (parish, district/county/unitary and parliamentary) are established.

Debriefing

125. LRF plans should include details of the intended debriefing process to be adopted following the response phase of an emergency or major incident. Further debriefing, to include formal evaluation for organisational development, should take place at a suitable time to cater for the recovery phase. Written accounts of all debriefs should be completed and retained for audit and disclosure purposes.

126. The SCG will determine how a multi-agency report will be compiled and circulated. Each organisation involved in the incident may conduct their own internal debrief. It is essential, however, that the findings of each debrief are brought to an overall multi-agency debrief convened on behalf of the SCG. This should be seen as an opportunity for all organisations involved (both statutory and voluntary) to share and understand what went well during the response and recovery phases, and also to identify areas for development that can be fed back into the LRF planning process.

127. Various forms of judicial and public inquiries may follow, often several years after the incident. Relevant legal advice should be sought at an early stage. The keeping of contemporaneous records and retention of all documentation should be catered for in LRF plans. It is advisable to appoint someone within the LRF or the LRF secretariat to co-ordinate and retain all relevant documentation. Further information relating to response and recovery can be found at https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance-common-issues

.

Cabinet Office
Civil Contingencies Secretariat
35 Great Smith Street
London
SW1P 3BQ

Email: CCAct@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk